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LIBERTARIANISM AND THE CHARITABLE 
TAX SUBSIDIES 
MIRANDA PERRY FLEISCHER* 
Abstract: Despite libertarianism’s political popularity, tax scholarship is 
largely silent about the interaction between libertarian principles and the 
structure of our tax system. To fill that gap, this Article mines the nuances of 
libertarian theory for insights into one feature of our tax system—the charita-
ble tax subsidies—and finds some surprising insights. Although one strand of 
libertarianism suggests that charitable tax subsidies are in and of themselves 
illegitimate, several other understandings of libertarianism see a role for the 
state to engage in a varying amount of redistribution or to provide varying 
amounts of public goods. Surprisingly, some readings even lend weight to the 
common criticism that the charitable tax subsidies do not do enough to assist 
the poor and disadvantaged. Only a lenient interpretation of classical liberal-
ism that conceives of a vibrant non-profit sector as a public good in and of it-
self and an expansive reading of left-libertarianism support something akin to 
our current structure, in which elite cultural institutions such as the opera are 
subsidized even if they provide no free or discounted services to the poor. In 
addressing these questions, this Article rounds out a series on the interaction 
of distributive justice and the charitable tax subsidies.  
INTRODUCTION 
Although many Americans claim to subscribe to libertarian theories of 
justice, tax scholarship is largely silent about the interaction between liber-
tarian principles and the structure of our tax system.1 This is not surprising, 
                                                                                                                           
 © 2015, Miranda Perry Fleischer. All rights reserved. 
 * Professor of Law, The University of San Diego. I would like to thank Larry Alexander, 
Michael Doran, Richard Epstein, Dov Fox, Maimon Schwarzschild, Mila Sohoni, Chris Wonnell, 
participants in the 2013 Columbia Tax Scholars Workshop and in the Pepperdine School of Law 
Tax Policy Colloquium, and especially Matt Zwolinski for extremely valuable feedback. I would 
also like to thank Ally Keegan for helpful research assistance. 
 1 Notable exceptions include work by Richard Epstein and Milton Friedman. See, e.g., MIL-
TON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 172–76, 191–92 (3d ed. 2002); MILTON FRIEDMAN 
& ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 120–27, 306–07 (1980); Rich-
ard A. Epstein, Can Anyone Beat the Flat Tax?, 19 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 140 (2002); Richard A. 
Epstein, Taxation with Representation: Or, the Libertarian Dilemma, 18 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 7 
(2005); Richard A. Epstein, Taxation in a Lockean World, 4 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 49 (1986); see 
also Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Death, Taxes, and Property (Rights): Nozick, Libertarianism, and the 
Estate Tax, 66 MAINE L. REV. 1 (2013) (challenging libertarian arguments against the estate tax); 
David G. Duff, Private Property and Tax Policy in a Libertarian World: A Critical Review, 18 
CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 23 (2005) (first discussing the tax policy implications of libertarian theories of 
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for what springs to mind when one hears the word “libertarianism” is Rob-
ert Nozick’s argument that taxation is slavery.2 If all taxation is indeed slav-
ery, why bother analyzing libertarian principles for insights into our tax sys-
tem? This dismissal, however, ignores the diversity of libertarian thought.3 
To that end, this Article mines the nuances of libertarian theory for insights 
into one feature of our tax system: the charitable tax subsidies. 
Exploring the nuances of libertarian theory yields some surprising re-
sults. Some strands of libertarian thought suggest that the charitable tax 
subsidies are in and of themselves illegitimate. These strands of libertarian-
ism forbid not only redistribution but also anything except the most mini-
mal provision of public goods needed to protect life and property, such as 
defense. Yet several other strands do see a role for the state to produce vary-
ing amounts of public goods and engage in some redistribution, ranging 
from providing a safety net to the very poorest to assisting victims of past 
injustices. Only a lenient interpretation of classical liberalism and an expan-
sive version of left-libertarianism, however, support something more akin to 
our current structure. 
By examining libertarianism, this Article rounds out a series examin-
ing what each theory of distributive justice common to legal scholarship 
suggests for the chartable tax subsidies. The goal of the series is two-fold. 
First, it argues that even though the charitable tax subsidies are inherently 
redistributive, existing scholarship on the topic (which focuses on efficiency 
and pluralism) generally ignores serious discussions of distributional is-
sues.4 This oversight leaves key questions unanswered in both current law 
and scholarship: should charities that receive tax benefits be required to 
help the poor? How valid are common criticisms that subsidized groups do 
“too much” for the wealthy and “too little” for the poor? How should we 
                                                                                                                           
private property rights on their own terms and then challenging those theories). Scholars have paid 
much more attention to the interaction of libertarian principles and the broader legal system; per-
haps the two most prominent examples are Epstein and Randy Barnett. See, e.g., RANDY E. BAR-
NETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (rev. ed. 2014); 
RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (2d ed. 
2014); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING INDIVIDUAL LIB-
ERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD (2002) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES]; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, 
SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES]; RICHARD 
A. EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM: A MODERN CASE FOR CLASSICAL LIBERALISM (2003) 
[hereinafter EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM]; Randy E. Barnett, Afterword: The Libertarian Middle Way, 
16 CHAPMAN L. REV. 349 (2013). 
 2 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 169 (1974). 
 3 For a discussion of the term “libertarianism,” see infra notes 68–75 and accompanying text 
(Part II). 
 4 See Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of Dis-
tributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505 (2010) [hereinafter Fleischer, Theorizing]. 
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evaluate the distributional impact of various proposals to reform the tax 
benefits given to the non-profit sector? 
Second, the series explores how each theory of distributive justice 
common to tax scholarship (equality of opportunity theories, utilitarianism,5 
and libertarianism) provides insight into those questions.6 A nuanced analy-
sis of libertarianism yields counterintuitive answers. One reading of mini-
mal state libertarianism, for example, suggests that only charities that help 
the very poor should be subsidized, whereas another implies that only or-
ganizations assisting individuals who have been harmed by past injustices 
should be subsidized. These two interpretations lend weight to the common 
criticism that the charitable tax subsidies do not do enough to assist the poor 
and disadvantaged. In contrast, classical liberalism suggests that groups 
providing public goods should be subsidized regardless of whether they 
assist the poor. Within classical liberalism, a strict understanding would 
likely narrow the definition of what counts as a public good suffering from 
market failure, whereas a more lenient interpretation might conceive of a 
strong non-profit sector as a public good in and of itself. Only that more 
lenient reading and an expansive reading of left-libertarianism support our 
current structure, in which elite cultural institutions such as the opera are 
subsidized even if they provide no free or discounted services to the poor. 
Most readings of utilitarianism and resource egalitarianism also suggest that 
there is something special about groups that help the poor and disadvan-
taged. This overlap suggests that the subsidies should be restructured to 
emphasize aid to such groups.7 
In exploring the nuances of libertarian theory, this Article starts from a 
different baseline from its sister articles. Prior articles first assumed the ex-
istence of the charitable tax subsidies as but one part of government efforts 
to engage in a given type of redistributive activity, and then explored how 
                                                                                                                           
 5 To be clear, some libertarians and classical liberals—most notably Epstein—employ a utili-
tarian framework in defending their views. In the context of this series, however, I am using the 
term “utilitarianism” to refer to “left” or non-libertarian, non-classical liberal theories of justice 
that employ utilitarianism to justify an extensive state with large redistributive programs. These 
theories—in contrast to those of utilitarian libertarians and classical liberals—place much less 
emphasis on the importance of private property rights, economic liberty, and private action. In-
stead, such theories place greater value on the benefits from government action. For example, such 
theories typically justify greater redistribution on the grounds of diminishing marginal utility and 
place less emphasis than the classical liberal or libertarian on the consequences to the upper-
income individual. 
 6 Miranda Perry Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity and the Charitable Tax Subsidies, 91 B.U. 
L. REV. 601 (2011) [hereinafter Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity]; Miranda Perry Fleischer, 
Utilitarianism and the Charitable Tax Subsidies: Problems and Priorities, 89 IND. L.J. 1485 
(2014) [hereinafter Fleischer, Utilitarianism]. 
 7 The next article in this series addresses how that insight translates into policy recommenda-
tions. 
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charitable tax subsidies to effectuate that redistribution might be structured. 
That starting point was used because both utilitarianism and equal oppor-
tunity theory accept a large role for the government in redistribution and in 
the provision of public goods. Prior articles thus sidestepped the difficult 
task of determining whether such goals would be better effectuated solely 
by the state, or by a combination of state and charitable activity. Instead, the 
articles reasoned that the valuable non-distributive goals of pluralism and 
efficiency suggested that subsidized charitable activity would supplement 
state efforts, and then proceeded from there.8 
But because the libertarian baseline concerning the proper scope of 
government is much different, this Article does not initially assume the ex-
istence of any governmental redistribution efforts or state provision of pub-
lic goods. Instead, it starts by asking to what extent each strand of libertari-
an theory countenances the governmental provision of any redistribution or 
public goods other than those necessary for the night watchman state. The 
Article then considers which types of public good activities currently subsi-
dized can legitimately be provided by the government, and whether out-
sourcing such provision through the charitable tax subsidies is consistent 
with libertarian theory.9 It sets aside, however, the question of whether the 
charitable tax subsidies would be the only justifiable means to these ends 
under libertarianism, or whether the state could also engage in these activi-
ties. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides background infor-
mation on the charitable tax subsidies, their theoretical justifications, and 
the existing questions about which the series as a whole is concerned.10 Part 
II briefly addresses what “libertarianism” means,11 and Part III explores the 
set of libertarian theories that are grounded in John Locke’s notion of self-
ownership and private property rights, including Nozick’s theories.12 Parts 
                                                                                                                           
 8 The overall goal of the series is not to explore whether a given theory of justice would have 
charitable tax subsidies in an ideal world and if so, how they would be designed. Attempts to use 
broad theories of justice to design specific policy systems are fraught with peril. But when ques-
tions arise in our current non-ideal world, normative theories underlie our responses. To that end, 
the goal of the series is to examine how various theories of distributive justice would shape our 
responses to recurring unanswered questions concerning the charitable tax subsidies: how would 
those who subscribe to utilitarian theories of justice answer these questions? How would resource 
egalitarians and libertarians answer them? What insights can we glean from comparing and con-
trasting these responses? 
 9 In so doing, this Article assumes the continuation of an income tax (as opposed to, for ex-
ample, a consumption tax), even though an ideal libertarian world might not have an income tax. 
As explained in note 8, supra, this Article explores what insights libertarian theory can provide in 
our existing non-ideal world. 
 10 See infra notes 16–67 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 68–75 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 76–145 and accompanying text. 
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IV and V, respectively, explore classical liberalism13 and left-
libertarianism.14 Part VI discusses an assumption implicit in the rest of the 
Article: the idea that if the government is justified in conducting a given 
activity, then subsidizing the charitable sector to do so is consistent with 
libertarianism.15 
I. THE CHARITABLE TAX SUBSIDIES: THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS AND 
UNRESOLVED ISSUES 
Although this Article does not take the existence of the charitable tax 
subsidies as a given, a sense of their theoretical justifications—and the un-
answered questions that remain—is helpful to understand the series as a 
whole and this Article’s contribution. Namely, a number of distributional 
questions are unresolved by current law and scholarship. This series seeks 
to compare and contrast the most common theories of distributive justice—
including libertarianism—for insights into those questions. Additionally, it 
is interesting to consider to what extent libertarianism supports or contra-
dicts current justifications for the subsidies, for such an understanding could 
help policymakers assess the current structure. 
Accordingly, section A of this Part explains the concept of tax subsi-
dies generally.16 Section B discusses the most common theories proffered 
for subsidizing charities;17 section C then explores the rationales for using 
tax subsidies as the mechanism to do so.18 Section D discusses some of the 
questions left unanswered by the theoretical justifications for granting tax 
subsidies to charities,19 and section E explains why distributive justice con-
cerns are relevant to those questions.20 
A. The Concept of Tax Subsidies 
Section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code allows individuals who 
donate to charity to reduce their taxable income by the amount donated;21 
section 501(c)(3) exempts charitable organizations from the corporate in-
come tax.22 These provisions, along with a variety of other tax benefits, 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See infra notes 146–286 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 287–321 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 322–324 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 21–30 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 33–43 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 44–63 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 64–67 and accompanying text. 
 21 I.R.C. § 170(c) (2012). 
 22 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
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such as the deduction for home mortgage interest23 or credits for purchasing 
solar panels,24 are widely considered to be subsidies for favored social poli-
cies that are hidden in the tax code. This concept (known as “tax expendi-
ture analysis”) emerged in the 1960s, based on the hope that by identifying 
hidden spending in the tax code, such provisions might be evaluated in the 
same manner as direct spending, their numbers reduced, and overall gov-
ernment spending decreased.25 
Briefly, tax expenditure analysis holds that any deviations from an ide-
al income tax base26 for social policy reasons should be considered indirect 
spending.27 To illustrate, assume that based on an ideal income tax, Adam 
would owe tax of $100. Next, imagine that society decides that anyone who 
purchases residential solar panels should receive a tax credit of $10. Adam 
purchases solar panels for his home, and reduces his taxes to $90. It is as if 
the government paid for $10 of his solar panels; the government has $10 
less in its pocket (from the foregone revenue) and Adam has $10 more in his 
pocket (from the decrease in his taxes). 
How does this apply in the case of charitable giving? Economists and 
tax scholars generally use the Schanz-Haig-Simons definition of income to 
determine what a “pure” income tax would tax.28 Under this definition, in-
come equals the sum of personal consumption plus increases in one’s 
wealth. If Adam spends $750 on personal consumption items such as food, 
clothes, housing, and wine during the year, and the value of his investments 
increases by $250, Adam has $1,000 in income. If, however, Adam spends 
$100 on items like paper clips for his business, that expenditure should not 
be treated as personal consumption, and that $100 should not be considered 
part of Adam’s income. An ideal income tax would therefore disallow de-
ductions for personal expenditures but allow deductions for business ex-
penses. 
It is easy to identify the credit for solar panels as a tax expenditure. 
Housing is clearly a personal consumption expenditure, so reducing Adam’s 
taxes because he buys solar panels for his house is an easily identifiable 
                                                                                                                           
 23 I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (2012). 
 24 I.R.C. § 25D (2012). 
 25 Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept and the Budget Re-
form Act of 1974, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 679, 679–81 (1974) (Surrey, the first to articu-
late this subject, termed this concept “tax expenditure analysis”); see id. at 697–98 (discussing the 
benefits of considering tax expenditures openly). 
 26 Dispute exists as to whether income is, in fact, the best tax base to use, or whether a differ-
ent tax base—such as wealth, endowment, or benefits received—should be used. 
 27 See Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 25, at 680. 
 28 See, e.g., Jerome Kurtz, The Interest Deduction Under Our Hybrid Tax System: Muddling 
Toward Accommodation, 50 TAX L. REV. 153, 158 (1995) (discussing the prominence of what is 
termed “the Haig-Simons definition”). 
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deviation from the norm of taxing income. Although it might be harder for a 
layperson to see, most tax scholars—across the ideological spectrum—
agree that charitable giving should also be considered personal consump-
tion.29 One voluntarily gives to charity, much like one decides whether to 
spend money on wine or a new sweater. In addition, donors receive a num-
ber of benefits (some tangible and some intangible), such as the “warm 
glow” of giving, the satisfaction of furthering causes that they support, and 
prestige and recognition from others.30 
B. Why Subsidize Charitable Activities? 
Based on the foregoing, most tax theorists consider sections 170(c) and 
501(c)(3) subsidies for the charitable sector.31 Theorists disagree, however, 
about why that sector deserves a subsidy. The oldest argument (the “tradi-
tional subsidy theory”) is that non-profit organizations provide benefits that 
are “good” for society. For example, they often reduce governmental bur-
dens, such as poor relief. Charities also provide diverse solutions to prob-
lems facing our society, and they offer alternative artistic and cultural view-
points. Finally, the very existence of a healthy charitable sector can act as a 
counterweight to governmental power and can enrich pluralism. 
The newer, more accepted justification for subsidizing non-profits is 
grounded in economics. According to this “economic subsidy theory,” sub-
sidizing charities helps them to provide public goods that would otherwise 
                                                                                                                           
 29 Although in the minority, a few academics justify these provisions on measurement 
grounds. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. 
L. REV. 309, 346 (1972) (discussing the charitable deduction); Boris I. Bittker & George K. 
Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 
299, 333 (1976) (analyzing tax exemption). 
 30 See M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market for Al-
truism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 583 (2009); see also Brian Galle, Social Enterprise: Who Needs 
It?, 54 B.C. L. REV. 2025, 2029 (2013) (discussing how current tax policy subsidizes the “warm 
glow”). Henderson and Malani go on to describe the “market” for charitable activity and offer an 
argument justifying corporate charitable activity on the grounds that shareholders care about utili-
ty from charitable activity in addition to monetary profits. See Henderson & Malani, supra, at 
588–90. 
 31 To illustrate, consider a taxpayer whose marginal rate is 40%. If she makes a $100 donation 
to charity and receives a $100 deduction, the deduction reduces her tax bill by $40. This $40 re-
duction in taxes lowers the net cost to her of her charitable transfer to $60, with the government in 
essence picking up the remaining $40 (the charity still gets $100, and the government has fore-
gone $40 in revenue it would otherwise collect). Offering taxpayers a subsidy for making charita-
ble gifts is thought to encourage taxpayers to make more contributions, in turn increasing the size 
and scope of non-profit activity. Tax exemption aids charities as follows. A taxable organization 
with net revenues of $100,000 that faces a 40% tax bill would have only $60,000 after taxes. But 
an exempt organization with similar revenues pays zero tax (ignoring the unrelated business in-
come tax), leaving it all $100,000 to spend on charitable activities in the future. The $40,000 in 
taxes that the government foregoes from the exempt group is its subsidy. 
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be under-produced. In the market, free-rider and other informational prob-
lems lead to market failure. At the government level, the median voter’s 
preferences32 or the outcome of processes such as logrolling can also lead to 
under-production. The charitable tax subsidies represent an implicit bargain 
among those who favor the various under-supplied public goods, with sup-
porters of each good agreeing to provide partial funding (by means of the 
subsidy) for the public goods supported by others. In this manner, the chari-
table tax subsidies allow taxpayers with tastes not reflected in the initial 
legislative process to redirect part of the funds otherwise flowing to the fed-
eral fisc toward their preferred public projects. 
C. Using the Tax System to Subsidize Charity 
The foregoing, of course, assumes that it is government’s role to pro-
vide the public goods or benefits just described. As this Article demon-
strates, many strands of libertarian thought dispute that assumption, alt-
hough some admit that limited redistribution or the limited provision of 
public goods is a proper role of government. Once it has been decided that 
government has a role to play in providing a given benefit, the next question 
is why charitable tax subsidies should be part of that project. 
Putting aside for now any reasons specific to libertarianism,33 theorists 
have identified several benefits from subsidizing charitable activity through 
the tax system. One theory argues that providing indirect subsidies via tax 
deductions (or credits)34 is more efficient than providing direct grants, be-
cause tax deductions allocate a given project’s cost in proportion to how 
much one values the project.35 In contrast, direct grants would increase eve-
                                                                                                                           
 32 Although majority preferences do not always prevail, the literature generally uses such a 
model for simplicity. See, e.g., JOHN D. COLOMBO & MARK A. HALL, THE CHARITABLE TAX 
EXEMPTION 102 (1995); Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector 
in a Three-Sector Economy, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS 21, 22–26 (Susan 
Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986). 
 33 Part VI of this Article discusses whether subsidizing the private production of public goods 
through the tax system is consistent with libertarianism. See infra notes 322–324 and accompany-
ing text. 
 34 Scholars debate, however, whether a tax deduction or a tax credit is more efficient. Com-
pare Jeff Strnad, The Charitable Contribution Deduction: A Politico-Economic Analysis, in THE 
ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 32, at 265, 272–76 (supporting a deduc-
tion), with Harold M. Hochman & James D. Rodgers, The Optimal Tax Treatment of Charitable 
Contributions, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 32, at 224, 236 (sup-
porting a credit). 
 35 See Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 
1393, 1399–1406 (1988) (summarizing the works of Hochman, Rodgers, and Weisbrod on both 
the deduction and exemption). This is so because high-demanders pay “more” by making a volun-
tary donation to the project, whereas low-demanders pay “less” by refusing to contribute but being 
forced (through the tax system) to indirectly pay something. See id. at 1402–03. This forced pay-
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ryone’s taxes uniformly, which would rarely (if ever) reflect the value a giv-
en taxpayer placed on the project.36 
Other theorists emphasize pluralism. In particular, Saul Levmore con-
ceptualizes the charitable deduction as a mechanism that allows individual 
taxpayers to “vote” on which projects deserve subsidies, and at what level.37 
This “taxes as ballots” theory argues that allowing taxpayers to vote in this 
manner best matches taxpayer support for a given project with the size of 
the subsidy granted to it.38 It further suggests that allowing taxpayers to 
have a say in determining which projects to fund will increase their com-
mitment to such projects, their activity levels as volunteers and monitors, 
and their toleration for higher levels of redistribution and government-
funded public goods.39 David Schizer similarly posits that giving individual 
taxpayers a voice in choosing which projects to support enhances generosity 
and monitoring.40 
The “donative theory” developed by John Colombo and Mark Hall 
identifies dual benefits from having taxpayers decide which activities to 
subsidize when they make donations.41 The theory first argues that the ex-
istence of donations signals that the recipient organization’s activities are 
under-supplied by the market and government and that the project therefore 
needs a subsidy.42 It next argues that the contributions show that project 
deserves a subsidy by demonstrating that the public believes the activities 
                                                                                                                           
ment is thought to reflect the fact that low-demanders do receive some benefit (even if small) from 
the subsidized project. See id. 
 36 Id. at 1402 (“People who desire more of a collective good, but who do not place great value 
on the increase, may refuse to support a subsidy because they fear that they will bear a dispropor-
tionate share of the tax cost.”). 
 37 Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 405 (1998). When someone do-
nates to charity and takes the corresponding deduction, he or she “votes” for that charity to receive 
a federal subsidy equal to the foregone tax revenue. See id. (“[E]ach individual taxpayer’s choice, 
deduction, or ‘ballot,’ . . . triggers a matching government contribution in the form of a reim-
bursement of part of the taxpayer-donor’s gift.”). Saul Levmore acknowledges two common criti-
cisms of this structure. Id. at 405–06. First, allowing taxpayers to vote this way could be compared 
to a “poll tax” because one must make an out-of-pocket payment to trigger a subsidy. Second, 
using a deduction (instead of a credit) gives more “votes” to higher-bracket taxpayers because of 
the upside-down effect of deductions. 
 38 See id. at 411–12; see also David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incen-
tives, Information and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221, 229 (2009). 
 39 Levmore, supra note 37, at 406. 
 40 Schizer, supra note 38, at 230–42, 257–67. Although Levmore and Schizer focused on the 
charitable contributions deduction, their arguments are somewhat translatable to tax exemption; all 
a taxpayer needs to do to direct a subsidy to a given project is start the requisite organization or 
purchase goods and services from it. 
 41 COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 32, at 99. 
 42 Id. at 107. One might wonder why donations alone are not enough to fund the activity at an 
appropriate level. Colombo and Hall respond that voluntary donations are subject to the same free-
rider problems that plague market provision, thus requiring a further subsidy from the govern-
ment. Id. at 104–05. 
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are beneficial.43 According to the donative theory, therefore, donations sig-
nal worthiness for both the deduction and tax exemption. 
D. Lingering Questions 
Despite the valuable insights into the charitable tax subsidies provided 
by existing scholarship, several questions remain unanswered. Most nota-
bly, existing law and current scholarship provide little help in prioritizing 
which projects deserve subsidies. The purposes listed in Internal Revenue 
Code sections 170 and 501 are vague and broadly construed; further, the 
negative prohibitions (such as the private inurement doctrine) that are used 
to police subsidized groups do little to illuminate why some activities but 
not others deserve a subsidy. 
Why is this breadth troubling? Given the differing conceptions of “the 
good” that citizens hold in our pluralistic society, why not allow such a 
wide range of groups to qualify for the charitable tax subsidies? Why ex-
plore the interaction of the charitable tax subsidies and distributive justice? 
This section briefly summarizes arguments tackled extensively elsewhere.44 
In addition to efficiency and pluralism, we must consider distributive justice 
to have a full understanding of the charitable tax subsidies. 
1. Current Law Is Confused 
One consequence of this breadth is that current law inconsistently re-
quires some organizations, but not others, to help the poor in order to quali-
fy for the subsidies. If a group serves an enumerated purpose other than the 
catch-all “charitable” purpose (as educational and religious organizations 
do), it is not required to the help the poor. Schools, for example, can qualify 
for the charitable tax subsidies without offering any scholarship assistance. 
This is so even though U.S. Supreme Court precedent requires enumerated-
purpose organizations to be “charitable”45 in other aspects of their opera-
tion, and “charitable” organizations sometimes must help the poor. The rea-
son for distinguishing among the statutory purposes in this manner remains 
unexplained.46 
                                                                                                                           
 43 Id. at 163–64. 
 44 Fleischer, Theorizing, supra note 4, at 508 (“While identifying these advantages is a neces-
sary and important contribution to our understanding of charitable giving policy, avoidance of 
distributive justice concerns ignores the very purpose of charity: voluntary redistribution.”). 
 45 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983) (refusing tax exemption to a 
university with a racially-discriminatory admissions policy because “entitlement to tax exemption 
depends on meeting certain common-law standards of charity”). 
 46 John Simon et al., The Federal Tax Treatment of Charitable Organizations, in THE NON-
PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 267, 277–78 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg 
eds., 2d ed. 2006) (discussing how some subsidized groups but not others are required to help the 
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Moreover, not all “charitable” groups are required to help the poor to 
qualify for the tax subsidies. For example, arts organizations do not need to 
help the poor to qualify, but housing assistance organizations generally do. 
Helping middle-class families afford housing in an otherwise unaffordable 
place like Manhattan is not considered charitable; providing housing assis-
tance to such families is considered charitable only if the neighborhood is 
decaying or the assisted families are racial minorities.47  
Similarly, the law governing health care organizations and aid to the 
poor is a mess. Technically, hospitals do not have to provide free or dis-
counted services to the poor.48 A number of scholars have noted, however, 
that hospitals are essentially required to do so by accepting Medicaid or 
having an open emergency room policy. Moreover, IRS rulings and court 
opinions basically require other types of health organizations, such as 
pharmacies and Health Maintenance Organizations (“HMOs”), to offer re-
duced-cost care to the poor.49 
                                                                                                                           
poor); John D. Colombo, The Role of Redistribution to the Poor in Federal Tax Exemption 4–13 
(2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing the changing standards used by 
courts and the IRS to determine whether groups are eligible for the subsidies). 
 47 Rev. Rul. 70-585, 1970-2 C.B. 115 (allowing tax exemption for organizations encouraging 
and supporting housing opportunities for low- and moderate-income families in neighborhoods 
where such housing helps reduce racial and ethnic imbalances and in neighborhoods where such 
housing helps combat community deterioration, but not for organizations encouraging and sup-
porting housing opportunities for moderate-income families in neighborhoods lacking housing for 
such families). 
 48 Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94 (specialized hospitals without emergency rooms offering 
no free or reduced-cost services to the poor may qualify for exemption); Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 
C.B. 117 (hospitals can qualify for exemption without offering inpatient care to indigent patients if 
they offer an open emergency room). That said, several states have begun challenging whether 
hospitals that do not offer free or reduced-cost services to the poor are eligible for property tax 
exemptions. See, e.g., Provena Covenant Med. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 925 N.E.2d 1131, 1154–
55 (Ill. 2010) (upholding the revocation of a hospital’s property tax exemption); see also John D. 
Colombo, Provena Covenant: The (Sort of) Final Chapter, 65 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 489, 496 
(2010). 
 49 See, e.g., IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 325 F.3d 1188, 1200 (10th Cir. 2003) (deny-
ing exempt status to an HMO that did not offer free or below-cost medical services); Fed’n Pharm. 
Serv., Inc. v. Comm’r, 625 F.2d 804, 809 (8th Cir. 1980) (denying exemption to a pharmacy that 
sold drugs and other items at cost to the poor and elderly); John D. Colombo, The Failure of 
Community Benefit, 15 HEALTH MATRIX 29, 30–37 (2005) (detailing various rulings denying tax 
exempt status to HMOs). In contrast, art galleries and community theaters need not reduce fees to 
the poor in order to qualify, yet groups that provide other recreational facilities for adults (such as 
health clubs) are generally required to do so. See Goldsboro Art League v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 337, 
344 (1980) (art galleries qualified for tax subsidies even though they did not reduce fees for the 
poor); John D. Colombo, The Role of Access in Charitable Tax Exemption, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 343, 
358–60, 384 (2004) (explaining how the IRS and the Tax Court historically have distinguished 
between non-profit and for-profit arts organizations and community theaters). In at least one in-
stance, however, an ice rink received exempt status with little more than vague plans to offer some 
sort of program for disadvantaged children. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 05-32-058 (Aug. 12, 2005) (“A 
. . . [p]rogram shall be offered to provide disadvantaged youth in the local area the opportunity to 
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The outpouring of charity after the September 11 terrorist attacks high-
lighted this confusion. Before September 11, disaster relief groups such as 
the Red Cross were allowed to help only victims with financial need. When 
such groups indicated that they would help families of all the victims, re-
gardless of financial need, the IRS balked. After public outcry, the IRS re-
lented and allowed assistance to non-needy families if the assistance was 
made “in good faith using objective standards.”50 
2. Public Policy Debates Raise Distributive Concerns 
Several public policy debates concerning the charitable tax subsidies 
also implicate distributive justice considerations. Several recent congres-
sional hearings on the subsidies have raised the issue of aid to the poor,51 
with both witnesses and lawmakers urging that Congress increase incentives 
for charitable gifts that help the poor.52 A number of other commentators 
have voiced similar concerns; debates about the size and use of university 
endowments also raise the issue.53 Likewise, some states have scaled back 
                                                                                                                           
learn to skate and to attend a day program at the Ice Arena.”). In that case, the IRS held that simp-
ly providing recreation on a nondiscriminatory basis promoted social welfare, thus meriting a 
subsidy. Id. 
 50 I.R.S. Notice 2001-78, 2001-2 C.B. 576; see JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, 
TAXATION OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 143–47 (2d ed. 2006) (summarizing the status of 
disaster relief as a charitable purpose); see also David Barstow & Diana B. Henriques, I.R.S. 
Makes an Exception on Terror Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2001, at B1 (reporting announcement of 
I.R.S. Notice 2001-78 and reactions thereto). 
 51 Tax-Exempt Charitable Organizations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the 
H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 110th Cong. 4 (2007) (statement of Rep. John Lewis, Chairman, 
Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means) (announcing the hearing and noting 
that one goal thereof will be to “review . . . charities’ efforts to assist diverse communities”); To 
Examine Whether Charitable Organizations Serve the Needs of Diverse Communities: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 110th Cong. 4 (2007) 
[hereinafter Diverse Communities Hearing] (statement of Rep. John Lewis, Chairman, Subcomm. 
on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means) (“[T]he resources of the charitable community 
do not exactly match our needs. Sadly those with the greatest need are not always served.”). 
 52 See Diverse Communities Hearing, supra note 51, at 57 (statement of Rep. Xavier Becerra, 
Member, Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means) (“So, you could probably 
incent noble activity by providing a better return for your contribution . . . if [it is] directed at the 
general welfare, or direct general welfare of serving those who are in need[.]”). 
 53 For example, former Labor Secretary Robert B. Reich has argued that the charitable sector 
needs to do more to promote equality and aid the less fortunate. Robert B. Reich, Opinion, Re-
vamp Deductions for the Rich’s ‘Charities,’ PITT. TRIB. REV. (Oct. 7, 2007), http://triblive.com/x/
pittsburghtrib/opinion/columnists/guests/s_531422.html [http://perma.cc/7YHA-FPRZ] (propos-
ing that donors be allowed to deduct the full amount of contributions to agencies that help the poor 
but only half the amount of contributions to other non-profits); see also Pablo Eisenberg, Opinion, 
What’s Wrong with Charitable Giving—and How to Fix It, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2009, at R1 
(urging foundations and wealthy donors to direct more of their giving to the poor and disadvan-
taged); Stephanie Strom, Big Gifts, Tax Breaks and a Debate on Charity, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 
2007, at A1 (collecting arguments for and against the proposition that more tax-subsidized chari-
table giving should help the poor). 
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property tax benefits for hospitals that do not provide a certain level of 
charity care; a few years ago, the Illinois Supreme Court revoked the state 
property tax exemption of a non-profit hospital on such grounds.54 Lastly, 
some early versions of the Affordable Care Act required hospitals to provide 
certain levels of charity care, although that requirement was later removed. 
In addition, policymakers are discussing several reforms to the chari-
table deduction’s structure. These range from capping the value of all item-
ized deductions to twenty-eight percent (even if the donor is in a higher 
bracket), instituting a floor beneath which contributions would not be de-
ductible, or changing the deduction to a credit.55 Each proposal would likely 
cause some donors to contribute less, and others to contribute more.56 Be-
cause high- and low-income donors generally contribute to different kinds 
of organizations, each proposal would likely change the amount of dona-
tions to various kinds of non-profits.57 Some organizations would be helped 
and some would be hurt, and the system needs a way to evaluate these out-
comes. 
3. Existing Scholarship Is Incomplete 
Existing scholarship provides little guidance on these questions, as it 
generally ignores distributive concerns. This is largely purposeful. Scholars 
turned to efficiency in the 1970s and 1980s out of frustration with the 
vagueness of the traditional subsidy theory, hoping to create objective tests 
for the charitable tax subsidies.58 In the 1990s and later, scholars refined 
these tests by integrating pluralism concerns.59 Together, existing scholar-
ship provides the following test for determining whether to subsidize a giv-
en project: (1) it must be a pure or impure public good; (2) it must suffer 
from market and government failures; (3) it cannot directly benefit the do-
nor; and (4) it must have some threshold level of support from people other 
than the donor.60 
Unfortunately, this body of scholarship is necessary but not sufficient 
for a full understanding of the charitable subsidies.61 As an initial matter, 
these tests do not help us prioritize among the many projects meeting their 
                                                                                                                           
 54 Provena Covenant, 925 N.E.2d at 1146–51. 
 55 See generally CONG. BUDGET OFF., OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE TAX TREATMENT OF 
CHARITABLE GIVING (2011) (analyzing the effects of various options for altering the tax treatment 
of charitable giving). 
 56 See id. 
 57 See id. 
 58 Fleischer, Theorizing, supra note 4, at 530. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 531. 
 61 See generally id. (arguing that a full understanding of the charitable tax subsidies requires 
consideration of distributive justice issues). 
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objective criteria. On the broadest level, what do we do when resources are 
scarce?62 How do we evaluate reform proposals that have winners and los-
ers? And more narrowly, how do we know if a given project really is a 
“public good”? After all, there are certain activities (like religion) that some 
consider “public goods” but that others consider “social costs.” Does a vol-
untary donation necessarily demonstrate the project’s worthiness? To bor-
row from Schizer, “[W]hy does the fact that a group of people want a 
ketchup museum justify subsidizing it?”63 More significantly, what should 
we do when the project in question is not harmless (like the ketchup muse-
um), but one that almost everyone agrees is harmful, such as racially segre-
gated schools? 
E. The Role of Distributive Justice 
In light of these unanswered questions, distributive justice is a logical 
place to turn for guidance for several reasons. First, the charitable tax subsi-
dies are inherently redistributive. This is obvious with respect to the chari-
table giving that the charitable deduction seeks to encourage: one person 
(the donor) parts with money or property, and another (the charity’s patron) 
benefits in the form of charitable goods or services.64 And with respect to 
both donative and non-donative organizations (groups that charge for their 
services, such as day care and health organizations) taxpayers pay more 
taxes than they would otherwise so that the group in question can receive a 
subsidy. The charitable tax subsidies are part of the tax system,65 and dis-
tributive justice issues play a key role in many other tax policy debates.66 
                                                                                                                           
 62 Several states, for example, have proposed limiting the tax benefits offered to non-profits in 
light of the economic downturn. Terry Schwadron, To Tax or Not to Tax? Cities Ask the Billion-
Dollar Question, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2007, at H30 (“Despite a long tradition of waiving taxes 
for charitable non-profit groups, communities are feeling more pressure to eliminate property-tax 
exemptions . . . as communities struggle over diminishing revenue . . . .”). 
 63 Fleischer, Theorizing, supra note 4, at 532; Schizer, supra note 38, at 230 (presenting a 
hypothetical eccentric donor determined to build a ketchup museum). 
 64 See John K. McNulty, Public Policy and Private Charity: A Tax Policy Perspective, 3 VA. 
TAX REV. 229, 247 (1984) (“Any analysis of philanthropy and its related tax allowances must 
consider that both its purpose and consequence is the redistribution of resources. Indeed, at an 
elemental level redistribution seems to be what philanthropy is.”). 
 65 See, e.g., Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 343, 345 (1989) (“[A] satisfactory tax policy must make its underlying ethical assump-
tions and distributional goals explicit.”). 
 66 See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro, Endowment and Inequality, in TAX JUSTICE: THE ONGOING 
DEBATE 123, 125 (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr. eds., 2002); Anne L. Alstott, 
Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 HARV. L. REV. 469 (2007); William D. An-
drews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Professor Warren, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
947, 947–53 (1975); Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: 
A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1907 (1987) (“[A]ll [tax] rate struc-
tures must be premised upon, and measured by, a theory of distributive justice.”); Lily L. Batchel-
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To that end, this Article is part of a series that explores the theories of 
distributive justice most common to tax scholarship (libertarianism, utilitar-
ianism, and equality of opportunity theories) for insight into these unre-
solved questions. For the most part, this series takes the existence of the 
charitable tax subsidies as a given. It is not attempting to assess whether an 
ideal utilitarian or egalitarian world, for example, would have the charitable 
tax incentives and what those incentives would look like.67 Instead, the se-
ries argues that answers to existing questions concerning the charitable tax 
subsidies will turn on our underlying normative priors. Looking more close-
ly at the most common theories of justice will show how each theory might 
answer those existing normative questions. If one is a resource egalitarian, 
what answers does a close read of egalitarian theory provide? Utilitarian 
theory? Libertarian theory? 
In exploring these questions, this Article on libertarianism and prior ar-
ticles on equality of opportunity and utilitarianism assessed their respective 
theories of justice in isolation. The series will conclude by reviewing the 
theories together, to see what insights can be gleaned from comparing and 
contrasting the responses that each theory provides. One such insight, for 
example, is that the non-profit activity for which there is the most overlap 
among the various distributive theories are programs that help the very 
poor, suggesting that there is something special about these organizations. 
II. LIBERTARIAN POLITICAL THEORY IN BRIEF 
Quite generally, libertarianism celebrates individual rights to be free 
from coercion, respect for private property rights, the primacy of the free 
market, and the idea that the market’s resulting distributions are just and 
should generally not be disturbed.68 What exactly this means, however, is 
                                                                                                                           
der, What Should Society Expect from Heirs? The Case for a Comprehensive Inheritance Tax, 63 
TAX L. REV. 1, 2 (2009); Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive 
Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952); Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the Consumption Tax, 44 
STAN. L. REV. 961 (1992); Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 
104 YALE L.J. 283, 291–92 (1994); Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 
YALE L.J. 259, 274–78 (1983); Eric Rakowski, Transferring Wealth Liberally, 51 TAX L. REV. 
419, 430 (1996); Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 
YALE L.J. 1081, 1082 (1980); Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Endowment, 55 DUKE L.J. 1145, 1149–
72 (2006). 
 67 It might be the case, for example, that in an ideal resource egalitarian world, direct gov-
ernment programs would be the only means of effectuating the ideal distribution. 
 68 For overviews of libertarian thought, see HARRY BRIGHOUSE, JUSTICE 86–94 (2004); WILL 
KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 102–65 (2d. ed. 2002); 
Eric Mack & Gerald F. Gaus, Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition, in 
HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL THEORY 115, 124–29 (Gerald F. Gaus & Chandran Kukathas eds., 
2004); Matt Zwolinski, Classical Liberalism and the Basic Income, 6 BASIC INCOME STUD. 1 
(2011) [hereinafter Zwolinski, Basic Income]; Peter Vallentyne & Bos van der Vossen, Libertari-
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contested. Most legal academics, for example, associate libertarianism with 
Nozick, who famously asserted that only “a minimal state, limited to the 
narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of 
contracts, and so on, is justified”69 and that “taxation is on par with forced 
labor.”70 
Such a view (commonly referred to as “minimal state libertarianism”), 
however, is but one point along a spectrum. Some theorists (“anarcho-
capitalists”) disagree that any state is justified at all, arguing that voluntary 
associations can provide the desired protection.71 A third group (“classical 
liberals”) believes that the government can legitimately provide a limited 
amount of public goods, though classical liberals differ in the amount and 
type of public goods they believe are justified. At one end of the classical 
liberal spectrum are those who believe that the government can legitimately 
fund varying amounts of public goods,72 even though they oppose many of 
the activities engaged in by our current government as well as the greater 
amount of redistribution favored by other kinds of utilitarians and resource 
egalitarians. On the other end of the spectrum are libertarians who also be-
lieve that the state can legitimately provide a minimal safety net to the des-
titute, or some type of “basic income” to all. And a fourth interpretation, 
“left libertarianism,” supports a large amount of redistribution, much like 
resource egalitarianism.73 
                                                                                                                           
anism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2014), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/libertarianism [http://perma.cc/TG2J-ECJ5]; and 
Matt Zwolinski, Libertarianism, INTERNET ENCYC. PHIL., http://www.iep.utm.edu/libertar 
[http://perma.cc/SA9D-NX9L]. 
 69 NOZICK, supra note 2, at ix. 
 70 Id. at 169. 
 71 See, e.g., DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, THE MACHINERY OF FREEDOM (3d ed. 2014); MICHAEL 
HUEMER, THE PROBLEM WITH POLITICAL AUTHORITY (2013); MURRAY ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS 
OF LIBERTY (1982). This Article sets aside these libertarian anarchist views and does not discuss 
them further. If they oppose even Nozick’s minimalist state, they would certainly oppose a state 
with taxes and tax subsidies for charitable purposes. 
 72 Even here, however, classical liberals differ among themselves in how rigid a definition of 
“public good” they would require. 
 73 Both “right-libertarians” (which include anarcho-capitalists, minimal state libertarians, and 
classical liberals) and “left-libertarians” assume an initial right of self-ownership. “Left-
libertarians,” however, argue that the right of self-ownership does not lead to private property 
rights in what were previously commonly-owned natural resources. In their view, redistributive 
taxation is justified to compensate non-appropriators for their lost use rights. See Part V, infra 
notes 287–321 and accompanying text, for a longer discussion of left-libertarianism. In contrast, 
“right-libertarians” believe that self-ownership leads to private property rights in previously un-
owned natural resources. Although this overlaps on many economic matters with “right” political 
doctrines (for example, opposition to most governmental economic regulation), it often parts with 
the political right when it comes to social policies. Most “right-libertarians,” for example, support 
policies such as drug legalization, equal rights regardless of sexual orientation, and abortion rights 
and oppose programs such as the death penalty and prayer in schools. To that end, Matt Zwolinski 
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Readers unfamiliar with the breadth of libertarian political philosophy 
might ask whether the acceptance of anything more than the night watch-
man state means a theory is not “libertarian.” A minority of philosophers 
argue so, and the philosophy literature contains debate about who “counts” 
as a libertarian. Some theorists argue, for example, that anarchy is the only 
social arrangement consistent with libertarianism.74 At the other end of the 
spectrum, some scholars distinguish between “classical liberal” and “liber-
tarian” views, while others believe that classical liberalism should be con-
sidered a subset of libertarianism.75 
This Article sets that debate aside. What matters for present purposes is 
that there is a set of beliefs distinct from both utilitarianism and from the 
type of liberal egalitarianism envisioned by John Rawls and the resource 
egalitarians. Views within that set have much in common with each other 
(individuals should be free from coercion; the free market should be left 
undisturbed to the greatest extent possible; and large-scale redistribution of 
the type in modern welfare states is unjust), even if they differ in their rigid-
ity. Many who hold these beliefs call themselves “libertarians” and are often 
referred to as such by others, even if the most rigid among them seek to lim-
it the term “libertarian.” It thus seems plausible to group these theories to-
gether, just as there is room in resource egalitarianism for both those who 
do and do not believe in talent-pooling. This Article thus follows scholars 
who group them together. 
III. MINIMAL STATE LIBERTARIANISM AND THE CHARITABLE  
TAX SUBSIDIES 
Because most legal academics associate libertarianism with Nozick, 
this Article first discusses the type of minimal state libertarianism that he 
made famous. As this Part shows, an initial look at minimal state libertari-
anism implies that any charitable tax subsidies are unjust—certainly includ-
ing the broad array of groups currently subsidized. A closer look at this set 
of theories, however, suggests that charitable tax subsidies for very targeted 
purposes—much narrower than under current law—are justified.76 
                                                                                                                           
has suggested that a better term is “market” libertarians. See Zwolinski, Basic Income, supra note 
68. 
 74 See, e.g., ROTHBARD, supra note 71. 
 75 Compare E-mail from Richard A. Epstein, James Parker Hall Distinguished Serv. Professor 
Emeritus of Law, Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., to author (Apr. 7, 2015, 07:06 PST) (on file with au-
thor) (drawing a distinction between classical liberalism and libertarianism), and EPSTEIN, SKEP-
TICISM, supra note 1, at 1–12, with JOHN TOMASI & MATT ZWOLINSKI, A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
LIBERTARIANISM (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at ch. 1) (draft on file with author) (classifying 
classical liberalism as a subset of libertarianism).  
 76 This Part III discusses which government activities are justifiable under minimal state liber-
tarianism. Part VI discusses why a libertarian might support outsourcing those activities to subsi-
1362 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:1345 
Section A of this Part traces the historical roots of minimal state liber-
tarianism.77 Section B discusses and rejects two overly simplistic assess-
ments of the interaction between the charitable tax subsidies and minimal 
state libertarianism.78 Section C explores whether the theory of rectification 
supports some charitable tax subsidies under minimal state libertarianism.79 
Section D examines whether using the charitable tax subsidies to fund a 
safety net strengthens private property rights, thereby rendering the subsi-
dies compatible with minimal state libertarianism.80 
A. The Origins of Minimal State Libertarianism 
As readers familiar with Nozick know, the most common justification 
for minimal state libertarianism stems from the theory of natural property 
rights and self-ownership articulated by Locke.81 Under this view, (1) natu-
ral resources are initially un-owned, but (2) each person has a property right 
in his or her own person and own labor. 82 Mixing one’s labor with land or 
other natural resources therefore gives that person property rights to that 
resource, subject to certain conditions.83 Most importantly, an individual 
may appropriate natural resources for himself only if “enough, and as good” 
is left for others.84 (This is known as the “Lockean proviso” or the “suffi-
ciency requirement” and is discussed further below).85 If these conditions 
are met, nobody else has a right to the newly appropriated resources,86 
which suggests that any redistributive taxation is unjust. 
Nozick’s entitlement theory builds upon Locke’s thought. Although 
Nozick does not fully flesh out his entitlement theory, he does articulate the 
three principles that would form the core of a complete entitlement theory: 
(1) justice in acquisition; (2) justice in transfer; and (3) the rectification of 
past injustice in holdings. Under these principles, if Alice justly acquires a 
                                                                                                                           
dized charities instead of having the government conduct them directly. See infra notes 322–324 
and accompanying text. 
 77 See infra notes 81–94 and accompanying text. 
 78 See infra notes 95–98 and accompanying text. 
 79 See infra notes 99–129 and accompanying text. 
 80 See infra notes 130–145 and accompanying text. 
 81 Introduction to THE LIBERTARIAN READER: CLASSIC & CONTEMPORARY WRITINGS FROM 
LAO-TZU TO MILTON FRIEDMAN, at xi–xii (David Boaz ed., 1997) (“[Locke’s] ideas have been an 
essential foundation for libertarian thought . . . .”). 
 82 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 19 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett 
Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 21. A second limitation is the spoilage limitation, which requires that one should not 
appropriate more resources than can be used before they spoil. Id. 
 85 Jeremy Waldron, Nozick and Locke: Filling the Space of Rights, 22 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 
81, 89 (2005). 
 86 LOCKE, supra note 82, at 30. 
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holding, she can do with it whatever she wants.87 How do we know if Alice 
has justly acquired a holding? Nozick argues that Alice’s appropriation of a 
given object is just if it satisfies the Lockean proviso, meaning that “the 
position of others no longer at liberty to use the thing is [not] worsened.”88 
Nozick interprets this to mean that others are not made worse off overall, 
even if they are made worse off in that they can no longer use or appropriate 
for themselves what Alice has taken for herself.89 To borrow an example 
from one scholar, Alice may appropriate a field previously farmed by many 
individuals, if enough other farmland is left for the others, or if Alice’s ap-
propriation of the field leaves the others in a similar or better position.90 
Perhaps, for example, Alice employs Ben to farm the fields, and the wage 
Alice pays Ben allows him to live as well or better than when he farmed the 
fields for himself.91 Both instances would satisfy the Lockean proviso. 
Nozick’s second principle, the principle of justice in transfer, focuses 
on whether Alice’s later actions with respect to her holdings are voluntary. If 
Alice freely gives her holdings to Christine, or freely transfers them to 
Christine in a voluntary exchange, the principle of justice in transfer is sat-
isfied. Christine’s ownership of that holding is just and cannot be interfered 
with via taxation or otherwise. 
Nozick illustrates these principles with his famous Wilt Chamberlain 
example, whereby one million people each drop a quarter into a box each 
time they see Chamberlain play basketball.92 At the end of the season, 
Chamberlain has $250,000, more than anyone else. Nozick uses this exam-
ple to argue against “time-slice” principles of justice that only look at end 
results. In his view, if the initial holdings of the audience members are just 
and they freely transfer their quarters for the thrill of watching Chamberlain 
play basketball, then nothing is unjust about the result even if money is now 
unequally distributed. Thus, taxing Chamberlain in order to achieve some 
                                                                                                                           
 87 Nozick does recognize the need for some limits on what one can do with one’s property in 
times of catastrophe. Imagine that Alice owns an island. NOZICK, supra note 2, at 180. Nozick 
admits, for example, that she cannot force a shipwrecked castaway to leave. Nor can she charge 
monopolistic prices if she owns the only waterhole in a desert. In a sense, use has its own 
“Lockean proviso,” for Alice cannot use her property in a way that makes others worse off. 
 88 Id. at 178. 
 89 Many scholars believe this interpretation is consistent with Locke’s view of the sufficiency 
requirement, given a later passage in which he argues that the worst-off person in the market-
oriented English economy is better off than a “king” in the Americas, where natural resources 
were still in abundance. LOCKE, supra note 82, at 25–26. 
 90 KYMLICKA, supra note 68, at 115–17; LOCKE, supra note 82, at 23–24. 
 91 KYMLICKA, supra note 68, at 115–17. 
 92 NOZICK, supra note 2, at 161–63. 
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other pattern of distribution (for example, one based on utilitarianism or 
resource egalitarianism) violates his justly achieved property rights.93 
The foregoing assumes, however, that the principles of justice in ac-
quisition and transfer have been satisfied. When either has been violated, 
then Nozick’s third principle, that of rectification, comes into play. Imagine 
that Alice’s acquisition of the holding was unjust, or the transfer to Chris-
tine was somehow unjust (perhaps Christine steals from Alice or defrauds 
her). If so, some type of compensation is due whomever was harmed, and 
this may justify taxation for the limited purpose of rectification.94 
Other than the limited case of rectification, however, this view appears 
to leave no room for any type of redistributive taxation. Absolute libertari-
anism holds that state provision of anything other than basic protective ser-
vices is unjust. 
B. The Initial Take on Minimal State Libertarianism and the  
Charitable Tax Subsidies 
The foregoing theory of property rights undergirds the common under-
standing of libertarianism, which is that all redistributive taxation is unjust. 
At the same time, however, Nozick and most other minimal state libertari-
ans stress the importance of private charity. But they are silent about the 
state subsidization of private charitable activity. 
Superficially, it seems that minimal state libertarians would applaud 
the charitable tax subsidies. Take the charitable deduction, which reduces 
Diane’s taxes when she gives to a charity. If Diane’s tax rate is 40%, then 
her tax bill drops by $40 when she donates $100 to charity. Looking solely 
at Diane, the deduction seems consistent with libertarianism: the $40 less 
that Diane pays in taxes is $40 less the government takes from her and re-
distributes to others against her will. But this ignores the fact that the cost of 
the charitable deduction is borne by many people, namely other individuals 
who pay higher taxes or individuals for whom services are reduced.95 
                                                                                                                           
 93 Id. A bit later, Nozick offers another argument against taxation. He imagines that requiring 
“unemployed hippies to work for the benefit of the needy” would be opposed on the grounds that 
such a requirement would be forced labor. Id. at 169. If forcing someone to work five hours for 
the needy is forced labor, he reasons, then so too is taking in taxes the fruits of five hours of work. 
Both interfere with one’s right to self-ownership, rendering taxation for redistributive purposes 
illegitimate on two grounds. 
 94 See id. at 152–53. Unfortunately, Nozick discusses the principle of rectification even less 
than he discusses justice in acquisition and justice in transfer. See id. at 153 (choosing “not [to] 
attempt [the] task” of specifying the details of the principles of acquisition of holdings, transfer of 
holdings, and rectification). He raises the idea, however, that Rawls’s difference principle might 
serve as a rough means of implementing rectification. Id. at 231. 
 95 See Eric M. Zolt, Tax Deductions for Charitable Contributions: Domestic Activities, For-
eign Activities, or None of the Above, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 361, 374 (2012). This reasoning, of 
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The charitable deduction, therefore, is better understood as another 
mechanism by which governmental redistribution96 is enforced. Diane acts 
as the government’s agent by deciding (with her $100 donation) which 
charity will get $40 from other taxpayers. And it is the latter transfer that 
should concern libertarians. Diane’s gift is not coerced by the government,97 
whereas the transfer from other taxpayers is coerced.98 
Seen in this light, the redistribution inherent in the charitable tax sub-
sidies appears to violate the basic principles of minimal state libertarianism, 
for it involuntarily takes from non-donors to give to charitable recipients. 
This reading, however, does not account for some of the nuances in the 
work of Nozick and other minimal state libertarians. The rest of this Part 
discusses two such nuances that might support two distinct sets of very lim-
ited charitable tax subsidies: the provision of a minimal safety net to the 
very destitute as a means of best protecting others’ property rights and the 
principle of rectification. 
C. The Principle of Rectification 
As explained earlier, the entitlement theory holds that the justice of the 
current distribution depends on not only whether the initial acquisition was 
just, but also whether later transfers were just. If existing conditions result 
from unjust acquisitions or transfers, then redistribution on the grounds of 
rectifying past injustice may be justified.99 To that end, Nozick notes that 
“past injustices might be so great as to make necessary in the short run a 
more extensive state in order to rectify them.”100 He further admits that us-
                                                                                                                           
course, assumes a constant budget and that to pay for tax subsidies, rates are increased or other 
benefits decreased. Given the existence of deficits, some may wonder whether this is true. In tax 
policy and scholarship, however, discussions of tax reform across the ideological spectrum assume 
that reduced rates must be accompanied by cuts in deductions and credits or that new deductions 
and credits must be paid for in some way, either by higher rates or cuts in other deductions and 
credits. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, which lowered rates in exchange for the repeal of or limits 
on a number of deductions and credits, exemplified these tradeoffs. See generally JEFFREY BIRN-
BAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH (1988) (recounting the passage of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986). 
 96 “Redistribution” as used here does not mean solely redistribution from the better- to the 
worse-off. It means any redistribution that occurs from one person to another, as when individuals 
are taxed to pay for goods and services enjoyed by others. 
 97 Although some might argue she is “coerced” in other ways, such as peer pressure or a de-
sire to make fundraisers go away, those are not the concern of libertarians because they do not 
involve the use of force. 
 98 Taxpayers at large are also one source of the subsidy inherent in tax exemption. 
 99 But see generally Jan Narveson, Present Payments, Past Wrongs: Correcting Impressions 
from Nozick on Restitution, 1 LIBERTARIAN PAPERS 1 (2009) (arguing that rectification involving 
anyone but the immediate parties is incompatible with libertarian thought because it involves 
coercion of third-parties not involved in past injustices). 
 100 NOZICK, supra note 2, at 231. 
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ing “patterned principles of distributive justice” might, in some cases, 
roughly match up with what the principle of rectification requires.101 
This, of course, leads to the question of how this might apply to the 
United States today. Here, it is quite likely that even minimal state libertari-
ans would countenance some taxation102 to finance the rectification of past 
injustices in our society: 
[Nozick] was never prepared to say that the historical-entitlement 
critique of equality and welfarism in his book amounted to a de-
fense of actually existing market institutions . . . . On the contrary, 
he thought it undeniable that contemporary holdings would be con-
demned as unjust by any remotely plausible conception of histori-
cal entitlement. (The point of Nozick’s argument . . . was that egal-
itarians were condemning the existing distribution for the wrong 
reason—that is, simply as unequal—rather than on account of the 
violence, fraud, expropriation, ethnic cleansing, state corruption, 
and so on, involved in the history of most holdings of property in 
America.)103 
Given this description of contemporary property holdings in the United 
States today, the idea of justifying some redistribution on the grounds of 
rectifying past injustice does not seem a stretch. 
1. Rectification and the Charitable Tax Subsidies: Initial Thoughts 
What then, does rectification entail? In theory, it involves three steps: 
(1) identifying past injustices; (2) trying to figure out what distribution 
would result if those past injustices had not occurred; and (3) then restoring 
the victims to a position as good as that which would have resulted without 
the injustices.104 Some instances of past injustice105 in our society are clear: 
                                                                                                                           
 101 Id. Adam James Tebble has characterized this pattern as “[t]o each according to their being 
no worse off [because of rectification] than they would have been had any injustice against them 
not taken place.” Adam James Tebble, The Tables Turned: Wilt Chamberlain Versus Robert 
Nozick on Rectification, 17 ECON. & PHIL. 89, 100 (2001). 
 102 Scholars read Nozick as regarding rectification as a duty of the state and therefore fi-
nanced by taxation. See, e.g., Narveson, supra note 99, at 3 (stating that many scholars view the 
appropriateness of taxation as an “implication[] widely attributed” to Nozick’s theory “including, 
apparently, . . . Nozick himself” but disagreeing with that implication); Tebble, supra note 101, at 
93 (assuming “safely” that the source of rectifying compensation will be taxation). 
 103 Waldron, supra note 85, at 103. 
 104 NOZICK, supra note 2, at 152–53; Lawrence Davis, Nozick’s Entitlement Theory, in READ-
ING NOZICK: ESSAYS ON ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 344, 351 (Jeffrey Paul ed., 1981); Teb-
ble, supra note 101, at 89, 92–93. To be clear, rectification does not involve identifying the pre-
cise holding that was the subject of an unjust transfer and returning that “holding” to its proper 
owner. Davis, supra, at 349. Nor does it turn on inheritance rights of descendants of those previ-
ously subject to an injustice. 
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our treatment of Native Americans, slavery, and past state-enforced discrim-
ination against women. To illustrate, it is likely that Native Americans ini-
tially acquired much of North America in accordance with the Lockean 
proviso—but then were deprived of their justly acquired holdings through 
theft, fraud, coercion, and physical force. Under Nozick’s principles, this 
injustice should be rectified.106 Likewise, many African Americans have 
suffered due to past injustices of slavery, violence, and state interferences 
with their freedom to contract and so on.107 And given past laws that inter-
fered with women’s freedom to hold property and to contract, a good argu-
ment can be made that some rectification is also due to women. 
Assume for now that the charitable tax subsidies will be part of a 
scheme to provide rectification to individuals harmed by these three injus-
tices.108 The next step is trying to figure out what position these individuals 
would have been in without the past injustices. This, of course, entails nu-
merous assumptions and counterfactuals.109 Imagine, for example, that Na-
tive Americans had not been defrauded out of their land. To trace the hold-
ings that would result, we would need to make assumptions about past indi-
viduals’ preferences concerning consumption versus saving, for that deci-
sion would affect the current distributional pattern. We would also need to 
know what past individuals would have done with their holdings at death—
                                                                                                                           
 105 A victim who was still alive would likely be owed compensation of the type discussed in 
the first portion of Nozick’s ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA. See NOZICK, supra note 2. If the 
original wrongdoer and victim are dead, however, rectification is the process that would be used 
to set things right. 
 106 For a fuller version of this argument, see David Lyons, The New Indian Claims and Origi-
nal Rights to Land, in READING NOZICK: ESSAYS ON ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA, supra note 
104, at 355 (arguing that land in the northeastern United States should be returned to Native 
American tribes). 
 107 For an argument along these lines that libertarianism requires affirmative action, see An-
drew Valls, The Libertarian Case for Affirmative Action, 25 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 299 (1999). 
Interestingly, Nozick alludes to this possibility when discussing rectification by citing to a “use-
ful” book written by noted tax professor Boris Bittker. See NOZICK, supra note 2, at 344 n.2 (cit-
ing BORIS BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1973)). 
 108 To be clear, this Article does not assert that rectification that is due as a matter of justice is 
the same as the voluntary act we normally associate with the word “charity.” The set of subsidies 
known as the charitable tax subsidies encompass a number of goods and services that do not meet 
that definition. Rather, this Article asserts that in assessing those subsidies from a libertarian per-
spective, one would first insist that the state was justified in coercing individuals to help pay for 
some activity. If so, then using the charitable tax subsidies to help finance that good is legitimate 
in order to harness the subsidies’ efficiency and pluralism benefits. Part VI of this Article discuss-
es why subsidizing charities to provide this rectification, either in lieu of or in addition to direct 
governmental provision, is consistent with libertarianism. See infra notes 322–324 and accompa-
nying text. 
 109 Nozick recognizes the difficulty of precisely identifying this counterfactual, acknowledg-
ing that estimates and probability distributions will likely be used. NOZICK, supra note 2, at 152–
53. 
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give them to charity, or bequeath them to heirs?110 And lastly, we would 
have to make some assumption about the growth rate of assets held in the 
past.111 Any estimation of what a given individual would be owed, there-
fore, would be exceedingly imprecise. Determining the holdings that would 
have resulted without slavery in this country involves additional complica-
tions. Should the baseline assumption be that large numbers of African 
Americans would have immigrated here voluntarily? Or would they have 
stayed in Africa? Or would they have been taken as slaves by another coun-
try?112 
Moreover, identifying the precise individuals alive today who merit 
rectification raises its own set of questions.113 Take, for example, African 
Americans. Assume that descendants of slaves deserve rectification.114 
Would other African Americans, whose holdings are less not because their 
ancestors were directly subjected to injustice, but because of conditions in 
our society arising from past injustice to others’ ancestors, also deserve rec-
tification? Imagine, for example, poor educational opportunities for African 
Americans that stem from underfunded public schools, which stem from 
low tax bases, which stem from past injustices in wealth and state-
sanctioned redlining practices. It is conceivable that many African-
American children currently in these schools are not the descendants of 
slaves, or of individuals who were directly harmed by redlining, yet they 
still suffer from the effects.115 One could also argue that even financially 
successful members of these groups—say, African American heart sur-
geons—are owed rectification, on the grounds that they might have been 
even more successful without the past injustices. 
                                                                                                                           
 110 See Robert E. Litan, On Rectification in Nozick’s Minimal State, 5 POL. THEORY 233, 
234–35 (1977); Tebble, supra note 101, at 103. 
 111 Valls, supra note 107, at 312; see also Richard A. Epstein, The Case Against Black Repa-
rations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1177, 1185–87 (2004) [hereinafter Epstein, Reparations] (discussing the 
difficulty of determining the extent to which corporations that engaged in slavery profited from 
the practice, and distinguishing reparations for slavery from restitution for owners of art stolen by 
the Nazis). 
 112 Even these are contestable assumptions. Perhaps Africans would not have immigrated to 
America in large numbers, and in the absence of slavery would have continued living in Africa (or 
had their rights violated by other countries). What pattern of holdings would have resulted then? 
 113 Some theorists read Nozick as requiring that a given individual actually trace his or her 
roots back to a victim and then establish that he or she would have somehow benefited from that 
victim’s holdings had there been no injustice, see Litan, supra note 110, at 244–45 (requiring such 
a link), whereas others do not require a direct link. 
 114 Of course, this raises the non-identity problem: most individuals alive today who are de-
scendants of slaves would likely not be alive but for the past unjust institution of slavery. For a 
thoughtful discussion of the non-identity problem in this context, see Larry Alexander & Maimon 
Schwarzschild, Book Review: Race Matters, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 31 (2013). 
 115 Litan, supra note 110, at 236 (recognizing that past unjust property transactions have like-
ly influenced “the present distribution of family and social backgrounds”). 
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One solution to these difficulties would be to assume that rectification 
should be due to all members of these identifiable victim groups, and not 
just to descendants of past victims.116 Working under that assumption, and 
given the difficulty of identifying the distribution that would have resulted 
without injustice, an easy but extremely imprecise solution appears: perhaps 
one could just compare the current situations of the victim group to that of 
the non-victim group (African Americans and Native Americans to white 
Americans, and women to men), and chalk the differences up to past injus-
tices.117 Next, one could plausibly think that any efforts to improve the posi-
tion of the victim group, to close those gaps, would be justified under the 
principle of rectification. 
The principle of rectification, then, could support subsidizing charita-
ble organizations that helped improve the situation of these groups. For ex-
ample, assuming that members of these groups have lesser educational and 
employment opportunities due to past injustices, then we would subsidize 
activities aimed at improving those: private schools in neighborhoods popu-
lated by these groups, tutoring programs, job skills training, and so on. But 
the principle of rectification might likely go further, and subsidize activities 
in any situation where the opportunities of the victim group fell short of the 
opportunities for white Americans or men. Take, for example, recreation. 
Many African American and Native Americans do not have the same rec-
reational opportunities as white Americans (access to summer camps, 
swimming pools, sports leagues, etc.). If that lack of access is due to past 
injustice, then the principle of rectification would suggest subsidizing such 
programs. The same would likely be true of cultural programs focused on 
the culture of victim groups, such as museums devoted to African-American 
art or music groups devoted to Native American music.118 Put another way, 
                                                                                                                           
 116 See, e.g., id. at 242 (suggesting that one approach to rectification might “consist of identi-
fying those characteristics of the present-day population that are most likely to be correlated with 
past injustices,” therefore “a very simple rectification procedure would award compensation to the 
Blacks and Indians for the prior injustices suffered by both groups at the hands of Whites”). 
 117 See Valls, supra note 107, for a more extensive elaboration of this reasoning. This of 
course, assumes not only that Native Americans, African Americans, and white Americans would 
have all made the same types of decisions as each other concerning education and jobs in the ab-
sence of past injustices (which is likely), but also that women and men would have made the same 
types of decisions as each other, which is more contested. There are further questions with respect 
to defining the control group. For example, should “men” include all men, including Native Amer-
icans and African Americans? Should the “white” control group include both women and men? 
 118 In some respects, by seeking to identify disparities due to past injustices but not those due 
to choice, this idea is similar to the choice versus chance distinction found in both luck egalitarian-
ism and left-libertarianism. None of these theories would remedy disparities due to choice. But 
because the comparative baseline is different, it is likely that rectification would suggest a differ-
ent set of subsidies than the other theories. For example, luck egalitarianism would subsidize as-
sistance to children born to poor families on the grounds they should have an equal shot. Rectifi-
cation would not do so, unless the differences were due to past injustices. 
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then, the charitable tax subsidies could be used as an “in-kind” complement 
to any direct financial resources that should be due under rectification. 
2. Rectification and the Charitable Tax Subsidies: Some Complications 
Several glaring difficulties with designing the charitable tax subsidies 
to assist in rectification present themselves. First, the above discussion 
makes several contestable assumptions in imagining what rectification 
might look like and to whom it might be due. Under the assumption that all 
members of the above victim groups merit rectification (an admittedly big 
assumption), a similar problem presents itself on the perpetrator side. In 
theory, rectification would only be due from those individuals whose posi-
tions are better off than they would be otherwise due to past injustices. This 
would clearly include, for example, perpetrators of such injustices and those 
who inherited holdings from past perpetrators. How can such people be 
identified? Would rectification be due only from inhabitants of the Southern 
states that practiced slavery? What of people whose families came to those 
states after slavery was abolished?119 
Perhaps one way to solve the problem of identifying those from whom 
rectification is due is as follows. An argument could be made that even if a 
given white individual’s family did not own slaves, he or she is financially 
better off due to the past injustices of others. This would be due, perhaps, to 
past injustices that reduced competition for jobs and comparatively in-
creased educational and cultural opportunities for whites but not African 
Americans, thus improving her position. Under this reasoning, we would 
want rectification to be paid by white taxpayers. There are several problems 
with this, however. First, the charitable tax subsidies are borne by all tax-
payers, not just white taxpayers. The only way out of this quandary would 
be to impose some type of very small surtax on white taxpayers to finance 
the government subsidization of charitable programs designed to effectuate 
rectification.120 Without such an adjustment, rectification would be paid by 
many individuals in addition to those who had benefitted from past injus-
tice.121 And even with such an adjustment, it is likely that the set of payers 
would be overbroad. Many white individuals have ancestors who died 
fighting for the north in the Civil War, and perhaps this sacrifice on the part 
of their ancestors should suffice when it comes to rectification from 
                                                                                                                           
 119 See Epstein, Reparations, supra note 111, at 1188. 
 120 Although this Article is theoretical, it is worth noting that this suggestion would be politi-
cally impossible. 
 121 Tebble, supra note 101, at 101 n.33. 
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them.122 And, as discussed below, many white individuals have also been 
subject to past state injustice and therefore should also be due rectification. 
A second problem comes to identifying victims. As previously dis-
cussed, focusing on groups that aid, say, any African Americans already 
makes quite a leap to assume that all African Americans have been harmed 
by past injustice. Thus, focusing on groups, and not individuals, requires 
making some assumptions that could likely be contested. Another complica-
tion emerges, however, when we want to identify groups in addition to Afri-
can Americans and Native Americans who merit rectification. To which 
other groups should rectification be extended? Perhaps it should be extend-
ed to Japanese Americans, because of the World War II Japanese internment 
camps. What about white Americans of European ancestry who immigrated 
under fraudulent arrangements in which the state played some role?123 What 
about ethnic groups such as Asians, Hispanics, the Irish, and Jews that at 
some point encountered state-sanctioned discrimination in the United 
States?124 It seems that almost every ethnic group, with the exception of 
wealthier white European settlers, has been the subject of past injustice by 
the state at some point. This illustrates not only the difficulty of identifying 
past victims, but also the fact that without the type of adjustment suggested 
above, many victims would also likely be paying for rectification as part of 
the broad group of taxpayers subsidizing charitable programs.125 
Interestingly, Nozick briefly raises the question of whether Rawls’s 
difference principle could be used as a means of rough justice here, on the 
grounds that the least-advantaged in society are the most likely to be the 
victims of past injustice.126 Although it is noteworthy that he raises this pos-
sibility, this is not a compelling means of identifying to whom rectification 
should be owed. Namely, it ignores deviations that are due not to past injus-
tice but to individual choices (whether on the part of individuals who are 
currently the least-advantaged or on the part of their ancestors). Imagine, 
for example, a well-off European family who immigrated very early in our 
country’s history and was never subject to any injustice. Living individuals 
from the family likely occupy all walks of life right now—both due to their 
                                                                                                                           
 122 Epstein, Reparations, supra note 111, at 1188. 
 123 Note that Nozick would not consider purely private discrimination—without theft or 
fraud—the grounds for rectification. 
 124 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (laundry permit rules discriminat-
ing against Chinese immigrants); Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10, 23–24 (N.D. Cal. 1900) (sham 
quarantine rules for Chinese immigrants). And what about individuals who were defrauded, stolen 
from, coerced, or subject to state coercion and discrimination in other countries before immigrat-
ing here? 
 125 See Litan, supra note 110, at 243 (discussing the likelihood that any identification of past 
victims and wrongdoers would likely be incorrect). 
 126 NOZICK, supra note 2, at 230–31. 
1372 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:1345 
own choices about how much schooling to obtain, what jobs to pursue, 
whether to become drug addicts, and so on, but also due perhaps to their 
parents,’ grand-parents,’ and great-grand-parents’ choices. Thus, there may 
well be individuals from that family who are currently among “the least-
advantaged” due to past voluntary choices and not due to past injustice.127 
3. Final Thoughts on Rectification 
The problem with designing the charitable tax subsidies to effectuate 
rectification,128 then, is that it requires historical facts that are essentially 
unknowable: who is a victim of past injustice? Who is a perpetrator? What 
would the country’s holdings look like if injustice had not occurred? In a 
sense, these unknowns undermine rectification in much the same way that 
implementing utilitarianism requires comparably unknowable information 
concerning an individual’s utility or the consequences of future actions. All 
that can be done is very rough justice. But what is noteworthy is that the 
concept of rectification would countenance some state-financed redistribu-
tion, unlike the more familiar take on minimal state libertarianism that usu-
ally springs to mind.129  
D. Funding a Safety Net to Strengthen the Private Property  
Rights of Others 
Putting aside rectification, most minimal state libertarians who empha-
size the primacy of individual property rights hold the absolutist view that 
any taxation beyond that necessary to fund the night watchman state is tan-
tamount to theft. There are exceptions, however, such as the influential lib-
ertarian philosopher Eric Mack. Mack “confess[es] to a fondness for the 
dictum that all taxation is theft,” yet argues that rights-based libertarianism 
could support taxation that would “fund something like a minimal safety-
net for individuals who would faultlessly find themselves in dire straits 
without that net.”130 
Simplifying a bit, Mack reasons as follows. Imagine a fully prepared 
hiker on a well-planned trip who, through no fault of her own, encounters 
unforeseen fatally cold temperatures.131 The hiker stumbles across an unoc-
                                                                                                                           
 127 Again, there is some overlap with the choice or chance distinction of luck egalitarianism 
and left-libertarianism. 
 128 There are also problems with prioritizing groups that pursue rectification. 
 129 Part VI of this Article discusses why subsidizing charities to engage in rectification (as 
opposed to direct governmental provision) is consistent with libertarianism. See infra notes 322–
324 and accompanying text. 
 130 Eric Mack, Non-Absolute Rights and Libertarian Taxation, 23 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 109, 
109 (2006). 
 131 Id. at 119. 
2015] Libertarianism and the Charitable Tax Subsidies 1373 
cupied locked cabin in the woods, with a fire and blankets that would save 
her life. The hiker, then, can save her life by violating the cabin owner’s 
property rights. Responding to this hypothetical, Mack thinks that “no plau-
sible moral theory” would allow this faultless hiker to freeze to death.132 
There are thus some instances in which property rights can be ignored. 
These instances, however, must be carefully limited to situations of ex-
treme need. A hiker who is merely tired and sore (and not at risk of death) 
should not be allowed to ignore the owner’s property rights.133 How does 
Mack draw the line? He looks at incentives: the more people that potentially 
can ignore the cabin owner’s rights, the greater incentive the cabin owner 
has to avoid situations where his rights will be violated (for example, the 
cabin owner could avoid such situations by moving to a warmer climate, the 
extreme wilderness, or putting stronger defenses around his cabin).134 Cabin 
owners would thus prefer to limit who can potentially ignore their rights. 
And because hikers likely care much more about avoiding death than avoid-
ing discomfort, Mack reasons that hikers would acquiesce to drawing a line 
between the two.135 
What does this mean for taxation? Most of us, of course, will not be 
faced with the issue of a freezing hiker breaking into a cabin. But a more 
realistic version of the freezing hiker would instead be a homeless person 
who sleeps in our garage or someone on the verge of starvation who steals a 
pie cooling in our window.136 Property owners, Mack reasons, have an in-
centive to preempt those types of incursions by providing a minimal safety 
net so that those in dire straits do not need to steal food or shelter from 
us.137 By thus minimizing the likelihood of individual excursions into prop-
erty rights, Mack believes a safety net would strengthen those property 
rights.  
Under this reasoning, the governmental provision of a minimal safety 
net does not necessarily contradict minimal state libertarianism.138 If the 
purpose of government is to protect property, and the government can do 
that by providing a safety net in addition to police, then such activity should 
                                                                                                                           
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 129. 
 134 Id. at 133. 
 135 Id. at 134. 
 136 Id. at 112. 
 137 Id. at 141. 
 138 Mack points out that Nozick off-handedly acknowledges that preventing moral catastrophe 
may justify ignoring rights, but then quickly dismisses those instances without discussion. Id. at 
112. Likewise, Mack notes that Ayn Rand admitted that emergencies might limit rights. Thus, 
Mack does not believe he is directly contradicting the libertarian theorists for whom self-
ownership and property rights are paramount. Id. at 113. 
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be considered legitimate.139 In making this argument, however, Mack limits 
the safety net’s provision to individuals whose dire straits are not their 
fault.140 Moreover, Mack would impose some type of workfare requirement, 
on the grounds that those who ignore property rights due to extreme need 
should compensate affected property owners wherever possible. Lastly, 
Mack limits this assistance to items like food, clothing, and shelter.141 
1. Implementation Concerns 
This nuance of minimal state libertarianism potentially justifies very 
limited charitable tax subsidies for organizations that provide basic needs to 
the very poor who are unable to support themselves through no fault of their 
own.142 Although a few practical complications arise, structuring subsidies 
to this end is far more feasible than structuring subsidies to effectuate recti-
fication. For example, one option might be to subsidize groups providing 
one or more of a given list of services to a clientele base primarily com-
prised of individuals at or under some benchmark determined by reference 
to the poverty line. 
This would involve a number of judgment calls, but once those calls 
are made, implementation would be fairly straightforward. Consider which 
services should be eligible. It seems that organizations providing food, 
clothing, shelter, and medical assistance help meet basic needs, and that art 
and recreation organizations do not. The main question seems to be how to 
treat activities like job training that are beyond what is needed for current 
subsistence but might enable a beneficiary to become self-sufficient in the 
future. Once that question is resolved, however, it is easy to identify what 
services a given charity provides. 
Next consider the task of determining whether someone is poor 
enough to merit assistance. Choosing a benchmark such as the poverty line, 
a percentage of that line, or enrollment in existing welfare programs, re-
quires making a choice, but again, either an individual qualifies or does not. 
Likewise, determining what percentage of a charity’s clientele should be 
below that benchmark involves a choice (should it be 50%, 75%, or 90%?). 
                                                                                                                           
 139 See id. at 141. This argument should not be confused with whether individuals can trespass 
in times of necessity, or whether individuals have a moral or legal duty to help those in need. This 
argument is about what activities the state may permissibly coerce its citizens to pay for. 
 140 In some respects, narrowing beneficiaries in this manner overlaps with some of the in-
sights of luck egalitarianism, though luck egalitarianism supports a far greater amount of redistri-
bution and to a greater number of people. See Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity, supra note 6. 
 141 Mack, supra note 130, at 140. 
 142 Part VI of this Article explains why the charitable provision of this safety net (as opposed 
to direct governmental provision) is consistent with libertarianism. See infra notes 322–324 and 
accompanying text. 
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But once that choice is made, identifying such charities is reasonably feasi-
ble. How would taxpayers or the IRS know which organizations qualify? In 
states with similar measures for state tax purposes, charities apply to and 
receive certification from the relevant state non-profit agency.143 This does 
not seem unduly intrusive or burdensome and many charities providing 
these services likely keep track of much of this information already, for the 
purposes of applying for foundation and government grants. 
On the other hand, determining who is responsible for their own pov-
erty and who is not would be extremely difficult and expensive, and may 
invite a level of governmental intrusion that libertarianism finds repugnant. 
Although the context is slightly different, many supporters of the basic in-
come favor providing an unconditional basic income to all citizens precisely 
so the government is not involved in making determinations about who is 
“deserving” and “not deserving”: 
Discriminating between the deserving and the undeserving poor 
requires states to possess a tremendous amount of information 
about some of the most intimate aspects of people’s lives. It might 
require knowing how much they earn from work, how much sup-
port they receive or could receive from relatives, how much effort 
they have expended at finding a job and doing well at it, whether 
they have spent their money on necessities or frivolous luxuries, 
etc. The answers to these questions—insofar as they are ascer-
tainable at all, could only be uncovered through the analysis of a 
massive amount of private information.144  
For these reasons, limiting the provision of a safety net only to the deserv-
ing poor may invite the type of governmental meddling into private lives 
that libertarian thought abhors. Initially, this concern seems unrelated to the 
charitable tax subsidies, for the charitable agencies that would require this 
information would be private actors. This overlooks, however, that the gov-
ernment would need that information to ascertain whether a given charitable 
organization was providing the type of assistance that merits a subsidy or 
not. It also overlooks the fact that subsidized charities are in essence the 
government’s agent. 
It is hard to know how to resolve these difficulties in a non-ideal 
world. In an ideal world with much less economic regulation (for example, 
without arbitrary licensing laws), it is quite likely that many more individu-
als would be able to find work that provided at least a subsistence level. 
That is not our world, however. As a result, two options present themselves. 
                                                                                                                           
 143 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1088 (West 2013). 
 144 Zwolinski, Basic Income, supra note 68, at 8. 
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On one hand, ignoring desert and instead providing a safety net to anyone in 
dire straits, regardless of the reasons, might be more consistent with liber-
tarianism due to the costs just identified. This is not to say that a given char-
ity could not impose work requirements, or limit its aid to individuals it de-
termines to be free of fault. It suggests only that imposing such a require-
ment as a precursor to eligibility for the charitable tax subsidies has draw-
backs. 
On the other hand, absence of desert could be assumed in the case of 
able-bodied adults, and aid limited only to the disabled, children, and the 
elderly. Although the former would be over-inclusive, the latter would be 
under-inclusive. Given the barriers to economic activity created by the cur-
rent regulatory state, however, it is plausible that even minimal state liber-
tarians might favor the former.145 
IV. CLASSICAL LIBERALISM 
As explored above, the minimal state libertarianism grounded in the 
natural right of self-ownership (such as Nozick’s entitlement theory) is ra-
ther absolute. Although some such libertarians (such as Mack) accept the 
legitimacy of a safety net for the extremely destitute, most believe that the 
only proper role of a state is to provide physical protection and enforce con-
tracts, and nothing else. In contrast, those on the “classical liberal” end of 
the libertarian spectrum146 believe that a slightly-more-than-minimal state 
can be justified. The phrase “slightly-more-than-minimal” reflects the fact 
that classical liberals (like the absolutists) reject the implementation of large 
scale welfare programs on utilitarian or egalitarian grounds, oppose most 
current government regulations, and strongly believe that government 
should be smaller than it currently is. On the other hand, classical liberals 
admit that in some instances, the government can legitimately do things 
such as provide public goods, reduce negative externalities, and prohibit 
monopolies: 
 The missing . . . element of many classical libertarian theories 
is that they do not offer a comprehensive explanation of the role 
of forced exchanges in structuring a political system. The princi-
ple of autonomy never permits a draft in times of war. . . . The 
principle of freedom of contract cannot distinguish between an 
ordinary sale and a cartel arrangement. A categorical prohibition 
                                                                                                                           
 145 The next Article in this series discusses these implementation concerns in more detail. 
 146 See Part II of this Article for a brief discussion of this debate. See supra notes 68–75 and 
accompanying text. For an illustration of some of the arguments levied by more absolute libertari-
ans, see Murray N. Rothbard, Milton Friedman Unraveled, 16 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 37 (2002) 
(arguing that Friedman should not be considered a libertarian). 
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against taking does not recognize any privilege to take property of 
others in time of necessity. The stripped-down libertarian theories 
. . . preclude[] the use of taxation, condemnation, and the state 
provision of infrastructure. These practices were part and parcel 
of government action long before the rise of the modern welfare 
state. Figuring out why these institutions are needed and how they 
should be designed and funded requires a major correction to the 
starker versions of libertarian theory, which is what the classical 
liberal approach seeks to supply. 
 Yet by the same token, the effort to respond to these difficulties 
does not require us to abandon the vision of limited government 
and fall into the deadly embrace of the welfare state. Even after 
all these adaptations are made, government would occupy a far 
smaller place than it holds under contemporary political theory 
and constitutional law.147 
Although classical liberals champion private property rights, their the-
oretical roots differ from Nozick’s deontological natural rights theory and 
are a bit harder to classify. Many (including Epstein, Friedman, and Frie-
drich Hayek) incorporate consequentialist arguments about the benefits that 
flow from free markets and robust property rights, as well as the harms that 
stem from government. Hayek, for example, argues that due to the diffusion 
of knowledge across individuals, free markets are superior to centralized 
planning.148 Epstein and others celebrate the ability of private property 
rights to solve problems such as the tragedy of the commons, yet decry the 
harmful incentives of large-scale government welfare programs. 
Yet these theorists also rely on liberal arguments from the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries about an individual’s right to be free from coer-
cion.149 These individual rights both limit what can be done to achieve the 
consequentialist goals they value (be it freedom or efficiency) and justify 
strong property rights and free markets (because free markets allow for the 
free expression of individual preferences). Friedman, for example, argues 
that the free market is a necessary precursor to political freedom, meaning 
                                                                                                                           
 147 EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM, supra note 1, at 7 (footnote omitted). 
 148 See generally FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960) [hereinafter 
HAYEK, CONSTITUTION] (arguing, inter alia, that free markets are more efficient than central 
planning because in a free market, those with the power to make decisions, the individuals, are the 
same as those with the information on which those decisions need to be based). Similarly, Fried-
man notes that “the great advances of civilization, whether in architecture or painting, in science 
or in literature, in industry or in agriculture, have never come from a centralized government.” 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 3. 
 149 See, e.g., EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM, supra note 1, at 2–5 (discussing the interrelation of con-
sequentialism and natural rights). 
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one’s ability to live one’s life free from coercion by others, free to resolve 
ethical problems how one sees fit, and generally free to do whatever one 
likes with one’s freedom.150 In contrast, government-run economies inter-
fere with freedom and entail coercion, because they force individuals to do 
what they would not do otherwise. In Hayek’s famous words, government 
planning is “the road to serfdom.”151 John Tomasi echoes this, arguing that 
economic liberty is just as important as religious and political freedom.152 
He believes that high liberal theories (such as those of Rawls) are defective 
in that they relegate economic liberty to a lesser status.153 
Others rely on contractarian justifications. Loren Lomasky, for exam-
ple, starts by characterizing individuals as project pursuers who value their 
ability to pursue whatever projects characterize their life.154 Inevitably, 
however, one person’s pursuit of a project will interfere with another’s. 
How does one maximize one’s ability to pursue one’s own project while 
minimizing the interference of others’?155 Lomasky’s answer is a twist on 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Instead of assuming that people are purely self-
interested, it reasons that individuals are empathetic social creatures. As 
such, they eventually adopt a cooperative strategy of deliberately attempting 
to avoid interfering with others.156 Each individual now has “valued moral 
space that each has reason to accord to the other,”157 and the boundaries of 
this non-interference constitute rights—including property rights. Because 
property enables individuals to pursue their projects, “each individual has 
some reason to extend deference to others with respect to their holdings 
conditional upon the receipt of like deference.”158 Because each individual 
wants as much freedom as possible to pursue his or her projects, the space 
that rights protect from interference by others is quite large, leading to a 
limited state with limited powers of taxation.159 
                                                                                                                           
 150 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1 at 1–22; see also BRIGHOUSE, supra note 68, at 86–94 
(summarizing Friedman’s arguments). 
 151 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 75–78 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter HAYEK, 
SERFDOM]. 
 152 See generally JOHN TOMASI, FREE MARKET FAIRNESS (2012) (arguing that economic 
liberty and social justice are complementary, rather than conflicting, ideals). 
 153 Id. 
 154 LOREN LOMASKY, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND THE MORAL COMMUNITY 25–27, 31–34 
(1989). 
 155 Id. at 65. 
 156 Id. at 65–79. 
 157 Id. at 73. 
 158 Id. at 120–21. 
 159 Id. at 79–83. For critiques of Lomasky, see Eric Mack, Against Agent-Neutral Value, 14 
REASON PAPERS 76 (1989); Christopher W. Morris, Loren Lomasky’s Derivation of Basic Rights, 
14 REASON PAPERS 86 (1989); and Douglas B. Rasmussen, The Right to Project Pursuit and the 
Human Telos, 14 REASON PAPERS 98 (1989). 
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What might this school of thought mean for the charitable tax subsi-
dies? As explored below, classical liberalism is a spectrum. One end of the 
spectrum would require a fairly rigorous justification for spending state re-
sources but would allow the government to provide public goods, strictly 
defined, and possibly a minimal safety net for the poor in addition.160 This 
reading of classical liberalism, however, does not justify the broad array of 
groups currently subsidized. At the other end of the spectrum is a more le-
nient interpretation that would support extremely broad subsidies like the 
current structure, even if direct governmental spending on all the activities 
currently covered could not be justified. 
The remainder of this Part examines the classical liberal perspective on 
two different theories that support the charitable tax subsidies. Section A 
explores the classical liberal approach to a safety net.161 Section B discusses 
public goods from a classical liberal perspective.162 
A. Classical Liberals and a Safety Net 
It will likely surprise most legal academics to learn that although clas-
sical liberal scholars oppose large-scale redistributive programs, many (but 
not all) display at least some concern for the poor and disadvantaged.163 
Scholars ranging from Locke, Adam Smith, Hayek, Friedman, and Epstein 
to even Ludwig von Mises, Ayn Rand and Murray Rothbard have defended 
classical liberalism in part because they believe it best promotes the inter-
ests of the poor.164 One scholar argues that this concern implies that even 
for classical liberals, social and economic systems that do not benefit the 
working poor are morally defective.165 Because of classical liberalism’s 
other commitments, however, this concern does not lead to broad-based 
redistribution or attempts at equalization. Instead, this concern has more of 
a sufficientarian flavor.166 Hayek, for example, carefully limits this provi-
sion to a minimum income that provides “security against severe physical 
privation” in contrast to assuring “a given standard of life . . . determined 
                                                                                                                           
 160 Part VI of this Article addresses whether the charitable tax subsidies are an acceptable way 
for the government to provide such goods. See infra notes 322–324 and accompanying text. 
 161 See infra notes 163–196 and accompanying text. 
 162 See infra notes 197– 286 and accompanying text. 
 163 TOMASI, supra note 152, at 125. 
 164 Id. at 127–39. This is not to suggest that all these thinkers viewed benefit to the poor as 
necessary to their defense of markets or a reason to support markets. Although some may hold that 
view, the point here is that at minimum, such theorists recognized that the benefit to the poor from 
markets was an additional good generated by markets. 
 165 Id. at 125; see also HAYEK, CONSTITUTION, supra note 148, at 259. 
 166 TOMASI, supra note 152, at 126–27; see also Jason Brennan & John Tomasi, Classical 
Liberalism, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 115, 122– 23 (David Estlund ed., 
2012) (explaining a sufficientarian case for the wellbeing of the disadvantaged). 
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by comparing the standard enjoyed by a person or a group with that of oth-
ers.”167 In his view, trying to achieve a “more even or more just distribution 
of goods”168 interferes with freedom in a way that providing a minimal safe-
ty net does not. 
To that end, a number of classical liberal scholars have explicitly 
voiced support for some type of minimal safety net.169 Justifications tend to 
fall into four camps: moral duty, self-protection or insurance on the part of 
the non-needy, free-rider problems, and the necessity of justifying a liberal 
scheme to all members, although many theorists are either vague about their 
reasoning or mix and match these arguments.170 Take Hayek, who concedes 
such a net on several different occasions.171 He states that “[t]here can be no 
doubt that some minimum of food, shelter, and clothing, sufficient to pre-
serve health and the capacity to work, can be assured to everybody.”172 Lat-
er, he writes that “[t]here is no reason why in a free society government 
should not assure to all protection against severe deprivation in the form of 
an assured minimum income, or a floor below which nobody need[s] to de-
scend.”173 Although Hayek adds that minimal safety nets “need not lead to a 
restriction of freedom, or a conflict with the rule of law,”174 he does not jus-
tify his support for such programs in any detail. At times, Hayek argues that 
these arrangements are in the interest of the non-needy by protecting them 
                                                                                                                           
 167 HAYEK, CONSTITUTION, supra note 148, at 259. 
 168 Id. 
 169 See, e.g., Elizabeth Anderson, How Should Egalitarians Cope with Market Risk?, 9 THEO-
RETICAL INQUIRIES L. 239, 262 (2008) (“As Hayek’s example shows, nearly everyone besides the 
most rigid libertarians accepts a sufficientarian safety net at the bottom.”); Stephen Macedo, Hau-
erwas, Liberalism, and Public Reason: Terms of Engagement?, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 
167 (2012) (“Classical liberal scholars, such as Friedrich A. Hayek and Milton Friedman, allowed 
for a social safety net, but opposed institutional mechanisms designed to promote social justice 
and fair equality of opportunity . . . .”). 
 170 Although these four justifications are the most common, other classical liberal scholars 
have offered differing justifications. Charles Murray, for example, has expressed sympathy for 
people who “get[] the short end of the stick on several dimensions” and thus suffer from poverty 
through no fault of their own, which echoes many of the arguments common to resource egalitari-
anism. CHARLES MURRAY, IN OUR HANDS: A PLAN TO REPLACE THE WELFARE STATE 4–5 
(2006) (proposing an annual minimum income as a replacement for the current array of tax and 
transfer programs). Eric Mack and Gerald Gaus provide a useful overview of the various argu-
ments for a safety net in Mack & Gaus, supra note 68, at 124–29. 
 171 See Adam James Tebble, Hayek and Social Justice: A Critique, 12 CRITICAL REV. INT’L 
SOC. & POL. PHIL. 581, 595–97 (2009) for a fuller discussion of these claims. 
 172 HAYEK, SERFDOM, supra note 151, at 133. 
 173 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, VOLUME 2: THE MIRAGE OF 
SOCIAL JUSTICE 87 (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, MIRAGE]. 
 174 Id. 
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“against acts of desperation on the part of the needy”175 or are akin to insur-
ance programs intended to prevent extreme misery.176 
At other times, however, Hayek suggests that such programs for the 
truly indigent are a moral duty of the community.177 Locke also appears to 
ground his support for a safety net in the concept of duty: 
God the Lord and Father of all, has given no one of his Children 
such a Property, in his peculiar Portion of the things of this World, 
but that he has given his needy Brother a Right to the Surplusage 
of his Goods; so that it cannot justly be denyed [sic] him, when 
his pressing Wants call for it. . . . As Justice gives every Man a 
Title to the product of his honest Industry, and the fair Acquisi-
tions of his Ancestors descended to him; so Charity gives every 
man a Title to so much out of another’s Plenty, as will keep him 
from extream [sic] want, where he has no means to subsist other-
wise . . . .178 
Whereas Hayek and Locke imply a duty to help the less fortunate, 
Friedman exemplifies the free-rider argument in favor of so doing. Consider 
                                                                                                                           
 175 HAYEK, CONSTITUTION, supra note 148, at 285. 
 176 HAYEK, MIRAGE, supra note 173, at 87; HAYEK, CONSTITUTION, supra note 148, at 286. 
 177 HAYEK, CONSTITUTION, supra note 148, at 285; FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW LEGISLA-
TION AND LIBERTY, VOLUME 1: RULES AND ORDER 152 (1973); HAYEK, MIRAGE, supra note 
173, at 87. 
 178 Waldron, supra note 85, at 91 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, FIRST TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT 
21 (1689)). To be clear, the precise meaning of this passage is the subject of debate among philos-
ophers. Although some theorists believe Locke only countenanced an “imperfect duty” (that is, a 
duty that is left to one’s discretion to perform) others believe Locke’s statements support a strong-
er duty of charity, one that endorses an extremely minimal government safety net. These theorists 
focus on Locke’s phrase that “Charity gives every Man a Title to so much out of another’s plen-
ty,” interpreting use of the word “title” to grant such men a positive right to subsistence aid. Id. 
Some scholars base this interpretation on the historical context in which Locke was working, not-
ing that he was writing in response to earlier thinkers’ conceptions of the duty of charity. See 
Robert Lamb & Benjamin Thompson, The Meaning of Charity in Locke’s Political Thought, 8 
EUR. J. POL. THEORY 229, 233–35 (2009), for a concise description of the conclusions of James 
Tully, A. John Simmons, and Jeremy Waldron on this point. To others, the fact that Locke con-
strained the right to private property with the spoilage and sufficiency provisions shows that 
Locke did not intend the right to private property to be utterly absolute. See, e.g., Steven Forde, 
The Charitable John Locke, 71 REV. POL. 438, 438–39 (2009); Waldron, supra note 85, at 89. 
And yet others emphasize passages elsewhere in Locke’s writings that discuss the preservation of 
mankind, or decry price gouging. See, e.g., Steven J. Heyman, Foundations of the Duty to Rescue, 
47 VAND. L. REV. 673, 701–02 (1994) (also believing this duty is enforceable). Notably, some 
scholars also believe that Thomas Hobbes supported the state provision of a minimal safety net. 
See, e.g., id. at 705 (“As Hobbes puts it, those who by unavoidable accident ‘become unable to 
maintain themselves by their labour . . . ought not to be left to the Charity of private persons; but 
to be provided for, (as far[] as the necessities of Nature require,) by the Lawes [sic] of the Com-
monwealth.’” (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 239 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1991) (1651))). 
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his support for a negative income tax, which he views as superior to the cur-
rent welfare system. In discussing poverty, Friedman first expresses a pref-
erence for voluntary charity. But he then proceeds to accept “governmental 
action to alleviate poverty; to set, as it were, a floor under the standard of 
life of every person in the community.”179 As he explains, 
I am distressed by the sight of poverty; I am benefited by its alle-
viation; but I am benefited equally whether I or someone else 
pays for its alleviation . . . . To put it differently, we might all of 
us be willing to contribute to the relief of poverty, provided eve-
ryone else did. We might not be willing to contribute to the same 
amount without such assurance. In small communities, public 
pressure can suffice . . . . In the large impersonal communities 
that are increasingly coming to dominate our society, it is much 
more difficult for it to do so.180 
Friedman thus supports some government aid to the poor because he thinks 
voluntary charity is insufficient due to free-rider problems.181 
The last argument in favor of a minimal safety net turns on the idea 
that in a liberal society, the political and economic order must be justifiable 
to all citizens.182 For these theorists, support for a sufficientarian safety net 
is intertwined with their justification of a classical liberal order in the first 
instance. Take Lomasky, who justifies robust individual rights by appealing 
to a vision of individuals who are simultaneously project pursuers and so-
cial creatures.183 In Lomasky’s ideal world (free of economic restrictions 
such as minimum wage laws, licensing laws, zoning laws, and so on), al-
most all individuals will be able to obtain what they “urgently need, even if 
not all that they would like to have.”184 But when someone lacks the most 
basic necessities, and therefore the prerequisites for project pursuit, an ex-
tremely limited safety net is justified.185 Lomasky reasons that otherwise, 
                                                                                                                           
 179 FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 191. 
 180 Id.  
 181 See id.; see also Mack & Gaus, supra note 68, at 124 (explaining Friedman’s approach). 
 182 For a summary of these arguments, see Zwolinski, Basic Income, supra note 68, at 1. 
 183 See supra notes 154–159 and accompanying text. 
 184 LOMASKY, supra note 154, at 126. Once they have the bare necessities, they may live as 
project pursuers, even though the responsibility devolves to them to obtain whatever is needed 
beyond the bare necessities to pursue their chosen projects. Id. 
 185 Id. at 126–29. Lomasky argued: 
If a person is otherwise unable to secure that which is necessary for his ability to 
live as a project pursuer, then he has a rightful claim to provision by others who 
have a surplus beyond what they require to live as project pursuers. In that strictly 
limited but crucial respect, basic rights extend beyond liberty rights to welfare 
rights. 
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individuals would face the choice of either pursuing their own projects or 
respecting the rights of others. Individuals who face such a choice would 
have no “rational stake in the moral community established by that system 
of rights,” and would withdraw the cooperation that makes that system pos-
sible.186 A minimal safety net is therefore necessary to get the buy-in that 
supports the system of rights in the first place.187 
Another type of justificatory argument is exemplified by Gerald Gaus. 
Gaus argues that a just society treats individuals as free (meaning that “each 
has a fundamental claim to determine what are her obligations and duties”) 
and equal (meaning that “members of the public are symmetrically placed 
insofar as no one has a natural or innate right to command others or to im-
pose obligations on them”).188 Because individuals are free and equal, any 
coercion must be justified to them. Free and equal individuals, however, 
will have differing conceptions of how much coercion (if any) is justified. 
Gaus reasons that given these different opinions, a just society is one which 
each individual concludes is better than no state at all: “[i]f a system of 
strong property rights is to be publicly justified, it must be the case that eve-
ryone has reason to accept it and no one has reason to reject it.”189 Gaus 
notes, however, that “some people inevitably are left out of the general 
abundance of modern economies,”190 and rational individuals will not con-
sent to a system of strong private property rights if they are made worse off 
by that system. To rectify any such harm, a sufficientarian safety net should 
be provided to those individuals otherwise left out. Only then will such in-
dividuals have reason to accept a system with strong property rights.191 
To be sure, recognizing that classical liberalism allows for the provi-
sion of a sufficientarian safety net does not necessarily mean that classical 
liberalism would support charitable tax subsidies for that purpose (instead 
of governmental provision).192  
                                                                                                                           
Id. at 126. For a critique of this argument, see Tibor R. Machan, Against Lomaskyan Welfare 
Rights, 14 REASON PAPERS 70, 70–75 (1989). 
 186 LOMASKY, supra note 154, at 127. 
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1. A Safety Net for All, or Some? 
Acknowledging that classical liberalism supports a minimal safety net 
leads to further questions: what should this safety net encompass, and who 
should be eligible? First, a minimal safety net would likely include soup 
kitchens, homeless shelters, emergency medical care, and basic provisions 
such as clothes and toiletries, but not services such as recreation programs, 
access to the arts, and the like. What is less clear is whether, in today’s 
world, classical liberalism justifies programs that go beyond basic subsist-
ence but enable the industrious to provide for themselves in the future—
activities such as child care that enable parents to work, and job training and 
other educational programs that would enable them to learn marketable 
skills. Although this Article does not provide an answer for this, it seems 
that a classical liberal safety net would be much more likely to include such 
services than a minimal state safety net of the type justified by Mack. 
Second, should this safety net be restricted to the “deserving poor,” 
that is, to individuals who are unable to support themselves through no fault 
of their own? At first glance, the answer seems to be yes; classical liberal 
scholars from Locke to Hayek make such a distinction when discussing aid 
to the very poor.193 Locke’s writings, for example, repeatedly emphasize the 
deserving poor, meaning those who are willing to work but due to circum-
stances beyond their control find themselves without enough to survive.194 
As discussed in Part III section D, however, determining which poor people 
are “deserving” requires a high level of government intrusion into their 
lives. It is plausible that a classical liberal may prefer to dismiss that re-
quirement, and instead aid any adult at a given income level or less, along 
with children, the elderly, and the disabled.195 Alternatively, one may prefer 
to implement that requirement indirectly, by providing such a safety net on-
ly to children, the elderly, and the disabled, but not to able-bodied adults.196 
                                                                                                                           
 193 Hayek, for example, focuses on individuals such as the unemployed, see HAYEK, CONSTI-
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a practical obstacle to implementing a safety net. See Part III, section D, supra notes 142–145, for 
a discussion of implementation issues related to safety nets. 
 196 The next Article in this series shall discuss implementation concerns related to a safety net 
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B. Classical Liberalism and Public Goods 
Classical liberalism generally makes room for “provision of public 
goods and improvements, education . . . [and] financial, health, and safety 
regulations.”197 These classical liberals tend to be consequentialists (such as 
Epstein and Friedman) who believe that a voluntary market economy cou-
pled with robust protections for private property and other economic liberty 
rights best promotes the public welfare.198 The main role of government is 
therefore to provide the framework necessary for a smoothly functioning 
free market.199 
These theorists recognize, however, that even a functioning market 
sometimes underprovides public goods because of free-rider and other ef-
fects. A public good is generally defined as a good that meets two criteria. 
The first is that the good is non-rivalrous, meaning that its use by one per-
son does not diminish its use by another.200 For example, Eloise’s enjoy-
ment of a clean environment does not diminish Frank’s enjoyment of a 
clean environment. The second is that the good is non-excludable, meaning 
that if it is provided to one person, others cannot be precluded from enjoy-
ing it as well.201 Imagine a fireworks show: once the show is provided, it is 
impossible to exclude anyone within viewing distance from enjoying it. 
This latter quality is thought to give rise to free-riding (why should Eloise 
pay for the fireworks show, when she can enjoy it even if she does not 
pay?), which in turn is thought to lead to the under-provision of such goods 
by private actors.202 Because the government can use its taxing power to 
overcome these problems, many consequentialist classical liberals endorse 
the governmental provision of public goods203 subject to market failure.204 
                                                                                                                           
 197 Gaus, Coercion, supra note 188, at 235; accord Gerald F. Gaus, Public and Private Inter-
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Other scholars, such as Gerald Gaus, justify the governmental provi-
sion of public goods using a contractarian framework.205 Gaus argues that a 
governmental system is just if each member of society would prefer that 
system to no government at all. In his view, if each individual would prefer 
a system with public goods such as clean air or national defense, but free-
riding makes market provision impossible, then governmental provision of 
that public good is justified. But as Gaus points out, “For any public good, 
we can think of at least one person who would prefer that the good not be 
secured.”206 So how can providing public goods be justified? In Gaus’s ide-
al world, objectors to any given public good would be exempted from pay-
ing for it.207 Recognizing that this is rarely a viable option, Gaus offers an-
other justification, one that tax scholars will find familiar. If individuals are 
not asked to justify the provision of each and every public good separately, 
but instead must simply justify a world that provides a bundle of public 
goods, each has reason to accept that bundle rather than reject it.208 Geor-
gia, who likes clean air but not the army, and Henry, who likes the army but 
does not care about clean air, would agree to a bundle of public goods that 
provides both the army and clean air.209 The danger, as Gaus notes, is that 
this could easily lead to the over-provision of public goods.210 
For these reasons, classical liberalism supports the governmental pro-
vision of goods that are public goods subject to market failure. Some classi-
cal liberals, however, insist on a stricter definition of public goods than oth-
ers. 
1. A Strict Definition of Public Goods 
One end of the classical liberal spectrum believes that the government 
can do a little—but not much—more than simply protect life and property 
(as minimal state libertarianism holds). These classical liberals would there-
fore fund public goods, but would likely insist on a strict adherence to the 
formal definition of a public good; they believe that that set of goods is 
smaller than popularly thought and that in many cases, the private market 
                                                                                                                           
B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 862–63 (1980). The analysis 
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can actually provide public goods.211 In some cases, this is because a given 
good lacks the non-excludability that defines public goods. Other times, 
free-riding may be less prevalent than commonly assumed. Lastly, in some 
instances, private action may be able to overcome the initial market failure 
after all.212 
a. Excludability 
Many classical liberals would argue that many goods traditionally con-
sidered public goods lack the non-excludability that defines pure public 
goods as an economic matter.213 If non-payors can be excluded from the 
good in question, then the private market can effectively provide it.214 In 
some cases, new technology makes excludability feasible where it was not 
before. For example, given the rise of cable, satellite, and other methods of 
viewing television programs, there is no reason that public television could 
not be offered only to those willing to pay.215 The willingness of audiences 
to buy or rent DVDs of popular public television shows like Downton Ab-
bey suggests that such willingness exists. Likewise, recent experiments with 
congestion pricing on roads show that excluding non-paying drivers is pos-
sible on roads other than those few roads traditionally thought to be amena-
ble to tolls.216 
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A number of activities provided by the charitable sector are not charac-
terized by non-excludability. Any non-profit that provides goods and ser-
vices for a charge, by definition, can exclude non-payors.217 Many such or-
ganizations, such as tax-exempt schools and hospitals, do just that. Exempt 
schools are not required to offer any scholarship assistance at all to qualify 
for the charitable tax subsidies;218 hospitals are likewise not required to 
provide any charity care for those otherwise unable to pay their medical 
expenses.219 Operas, symphonies, and the ballet can exclude non-payors 
from viewing their performances, and museums can limit admission to 
those paying an entrance fee. Even some research, like scientific research, 
could be made available selectively via licensing and patents.220 
Charitable tax subsidies that comported with a more rigid definition of 
public goods would therefore subsidize a much smaller number of activities 
than under current law. Pure environmental research would likely qualify, 
and maybe some medical and scientific research that could not be mone-
tized into licenses and patents.221 Providing basic needs to the poor would 
be subsidized as well; based on the arguments in section A, subsection 1 of 
this Part, limiting such aid to those who can pay defeats the purpose of such 
aid. Several other activities not mentioned here might also qualify, but the 
take-away is that many activities currently subsidized would not be. 
For some excludable activities, however, subsidization may be justi-
fied nonetheless. This might be true in two instances. Some activities (such 
as going to an art museum) might generate positive externalities if their 
benefits are extended to non-payors or to those who would not pay the price 
demanded in an unsubsidized market. In other cases, something about the 
nature of an activity might lead non-profits to provide it, ensuring the ac-
tivity’s efficient provision has positive externalities, and subsidization might 
be justified to overcome constraints imposed by the non-distribution con-
straint. In each case, the argument would be that the positive externalities 
exhibit non-excludability, thus indicating a market failure. These possibili-
ties are explored below. 
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i. The non-distribution constraint and positive externalities 
Many excludable activities that are currently subsidized (such as health 
care, education, day care, and nursing home care) represent complex per-
sonal services. According to Henry Hansmann, a contract failure arises be-
cause purchasers have no way of judging the quality of the service being 
provided; this contract failure leads firms providing these services to organ-
ize as non-profits.222 The resulting inability to distribute profits, Hansmann 
reasons, assures purchasers that their payments will be used to provide a 
quality service, instead of being diverted for managers’ personal uses.223 
The downside of the non-distribution constraint is that it impedes an organi-
zation’s ability to raise capital. Hansmann argues that tax subsidies are justi-
fied to make up for the inability to raise capital.224 
This argument, however, raises the question of why such organizations 
deserve a subsidy. After all, many organizations face difficulties raising 
capital, and other types of complex services (such as car repair) face infor-
mation constraints similar to those thought to lead to contract failure when 
it comes to health care or schools. If providers of the former can overcome 
information asymmetries and continue to operate in the for-profit market, a 
classical liberal might ask what is different about a health care provider. 
The strongest answer would be that the consequences of a consumer 
making a poor choice in the health care or education sector are graver than 
when a consumer makes a poor choice about car repair. If a crooked auto 
repair shop promises to repair the squeak a car is making and does not do 
so, the car’s owner is the only one harmed.225 But if a hospital, nursing 
home, or school deceives someone, society suffers because it is in society’s 
interest as a whole for the population to remain healthy, well cared for, and 
educated. In other words, the services provided by these firms generate pos-
itive externalities when they are high quality and negative externalities 
when they are low quality. These positive externalities (a healthy and edu-
cated population) exhibit non-excludability, thus justifying government sub-
sidization for firms organizing as non-profits. 
One problem with the foregoing argument, however, is that it assumes 
a lack of sophistication on the part of consumers that many classical liberals 
would likely find repugnant. Consider the myriad ways consumers may 
now gather information about a given service provider, such as internet re-
view sites, consumer message boards, third party certification, and review 
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1390 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:1345 
of required regulatory filings (which are often available online). If enough 
information is available for consumers to decide for themselves which nurs-
ing homes (for example) provide quality care, then the non-distribution 
constraint would be extraneous.226 If so, then subsidization is also extrane-
ous. 
Along the same lines, scholars have suggested two contractual mecha-
nisms whereby for-profit providers might reassure consumers that funds are 
being used as promised.227 First, such providers could promise donors (or 
purchasers) via contract that they would hire a manager at a fixed salary to 
run the enterprise.228 The contract would preclude the manager from own-
ing shares in the firm, and it would limit his ability to indirectly extract 
profits via perks. If desired, an outside auditor could be hired to police the 
contract. If the manager skimped on the firm’s operation in order to some-
how benefit from increased profits, donors (or purchasers) could sue for 
breach of contract. A second option would be for providers either to charge 
on a cost-plus basis or refund profits at year’s end.229 Both would mimic 
cooperative pricing schemes by contractually ensuring that residual profits 
are returned to the donor/purchaser and by giving the donor (or purchaser) 
the ability to sue for breach of contract if that did not occur. According to 
this theory, the fixed wage aspect of these mechanisms minimizes the incen-
tive of whoever is running the firm to skimp on quality.230 Again, if the non-
distribution constraint is extraneous, then so is subsidization.231 
Moreover, there are many sectors (including health care) where non-
profits operate alongside for-profits. Given that non-profits and for-profits 
often provide similar services, how can it be said that the non-distribution 
constraint is a necessary feature of providing that service? To justify subsi-
dizing these organizations because of the non-distribution constraint, a clas-
sical liberal would desire proof that there was something intrinsically dif-
ferent about the non-profit and for-profit provision of what seemed like an 
identical service, and that that difference justifies subsidization. 
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Consider hospitals. Some studies have suggested that non-profit hospi-
tals are neither more efficient nor provide more charity care than for-profit 
hospitals. On the other hand, there is some evidence that non-profit hospi-
tals are more likely than for-profit hospitals to provide unprofitable medical 
services such as emergency psychiatry services, whereas for-profit hospitals 
focus on more profitable areas like cardiac medicine.232 
If one assumes then that non-profit hospitals are more likely to provide 
unprofitable services, and that society has an interest in ensuring these ser-
vices are provided even if they would not be under normal market provi-
sions, the question becomes: why subsidize all non-profit health providers 
just because some engage in activities worthy of subsidization? And of 
those engaging in activities worthy of subsidization, why subsidize all of 
their activities, instead of simply those deemed worthy of subsidization? 
Subsidizing only the latter—for example, the provision of mental health 
services, whether by non-profit or for-profit providers—is more consistent 
with classical liberalism than subsidizing the whole non-profit health care 
sector. 
ii. Merit goods 
Two additional potential arguments for subsidizing excludable activi-
ties relate to the concept of merit goods. Briefly, merit goods are goods that 
individuals purchase “too little” of from the market for society’s taste.233 
Examples include education, health care, environmental amenities, and cul-
tural activities.234 Many of these, of course, are excludable; schools can ex-
clude non-payors. Likewise, museums, operas, and symphonies can restrict 
admission to patrons who pay. The theory holds that if individual prefer-
ences, as reflected by market decisions to purchase such experiences, do not 
reflect society’s overall preferences regarding the appropriate amount of 
such activities, then government provision is warranted. This is so even if it 
means disregarding individuals’ preferences as expressed in the market.235 
One potential justification for governmental provision of such services 
is as follows. Perhaps these activities generate positive externalities if their 
benefits are extended to non-payors or to those who will not pay the price 
demanded in an unsubsidized market. If those benefits exhibit non-
excludability, then perhaps subsidization is justified. Subsidizing these ac-
tivities would thus turn on the idea that there are benefits beyond the initial 
users and that these positive externalities constitute a public good from 
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which nobody can be excluded. This, of course, assumes second-order ben-
efits—for example, that the existence of art provides consumption value to 
people other than those who go to a museum or attend a play. The more 
people who consume art, the more second-order benefits are generated. A 
related argument for providing merit goods is that individuals do not know 
their own preferences for them because the benefits from art or education 
are indirect or far in the future. Government provision is warranted, some 
argue, to “correct” individual preferences. 
Both justifications raise essentially the same question for a classical 
liberal: how do we know which preferences should be overridden (why 
opera but not zombie movies), and how do we know which activities gener-
ate a second-order benefit? It might be the case, for example, that art affects 
some people’s utility negatively.236 One scholar notes that “elites” would 
likely decide.237 Indeed, several scholars have noted that many activities 
considered merit goods—such as art and education—reflect the tastes of the 
middle-class cultural elite.238 That is likely an unsatisfactory response for 
the classical liberal, because it allows the tastes of a few to override indi-
viduals’ expressed preferences. Nor can the answer lie in the bargain that 
tax scholars generally rely on to justify the charitable tax subsidies.239 Clas-
sical liberals would argue majority approval does not override the bounda-
ries of what government may or may not do. Due to these and other difficul-
ties, some scholars have argued that the political process is incapable of 
improving upon the market when it comes to merit goods.240 
On the other hand, it might be the case that individuals have two sets 
of preferences, market preferences and reflective preferences expressed 
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(1966). 
2015] Libertarianism and the Charitable Tax Subsidies 1393 
through the political process. To borrow an example, imagine a smoker.241 
His market preferences are to buy cigarettes to assuage his cravings. But he 
may desperately wish to rid himself of the desire to smoke. In this case, he 
has a meta-preference about smoking, and might act upon that preference 
by voting for stricter anti-smoking measures. Scholars make a similar ar-
gument about merit goods. They recast such goods as goods that an “indi-
vidual recognizes he ought to provide, but which due to weakness of will, 
moral turpitude or laxity he will not adequately provide in the market where 
the cost in ‘selfish pleasure’ foregone is too high.”242 Under this view, the 
government provision of merit goods simply reflects individuals’ reflective 
meta-preferences, and therefore is not necessarily inconsistent with individ-
ual sovereignty. 
b. Free-Riding 
As discussed above, a classical liberal would likely insist that a given 
activity exhibit non-excludability or (if excludable) generate positive exter-
nalities before supporting the government provision thereof. Although such 
characteristics would be necessary precursors to government provision, they 
would likely not be sufficient; a classical liberal would also want some as-
surance that free-riding was, in fact, a problem and that government inter-
vention was necessary to overcome it.243 If it were the case that free-riding 
did not affect willingness to pay for a given collective good, then there 
would be no justification for the government to tax its citizens to pay for it. 
At least one experiment, for example, suggests that individuals still reveal 
their true demand for goods like television programming or theater perfor-
mances even when they are told they will not be excluded if they do not 
contribute.244 If this were true of other goods currently subsidized, classical 
liberalism would argue that such subsidies are unfounded.245 
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i. Using social mechanisms to overcome free-riding 
Even assuming an inclination to free-ride, however, a variety of social 
mechanisms might temper that tendency.246 Churches, for instance, benefit 
from their club-like nature in limiting free-riders.247 In other contexts, some 
individuals might be aware that the welfare of their friends and neighbors 
depends on what they do, minimizing free-riding.248 Additionally, social 
pressure and moral suasion can minimize free-riders.249 An elementary 
school, for example, may give out a class-wide pizza party to the first class 
to reach 100% participation in the annual fund.250 There, both the stigma of 
being the holdout that precludes one’s child’s kindergarten class from hav-
ing a special pizza party and the desire to tangibly benefit one’s child by 
allowing them to enjoy the party minimize free-riding. 
Donor lists inside any college alumni magazine or opera program fur-
ther illustrate the power of social pressure. Donors are well aware of the 
recognition that accompanies giving at a certain level, and often adjust their 
giving to fall within the next most prestigious level of giving—but at the 
lowest cost to themselves possible.251 To illustrate, imagine that an alumni 
magazine lists donors at the $250–$500 level, the $500–$750 level, and the 
$750–$1000 level.252 Gifts will tend to cluster at the lowest contribution 
amount necessary to jump into a given level; donors are much more likely 
to contribute $500 than $499, $750 than $749, and $1000 than $999. This 
suggests that recognition plays a role of some importance in driving giving 
patterns. The sale of naming rights is another example of using social forces 
to overcome free-riding; for that reason, some scholars have proposed disal-
lowing a charitable deduction for donations that come with naming 
rights.253 
Of course, social pressure and moral suasion are more likely to work in 
some situations than others. The settings where these types of incentives are 
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currently employed—such as churches, schools, and the opera—generally 
provide benefits to a well-defined group of people and exhibit a club-like 
nature. Individual churches tend to be relatively small organizations where 
members know one another. Similar communities develop around schools, 
either through the parents’ social lives (for a K–12 school) or among alumni 
of a given college or university. Such alumni have an incentive to maintain 
or enhance their image with their peers, as do donors to operas. In instances 
where the users of charitable services may not have that incentive (for ex-
ample, hospital patients), auxiliary groups are often created precisely to fos-
ter a club-like setting where social status can be cemented or maintained. In 
contrast, organizations with a large number of widely dispersed beneficiar-
ies (such as environmental or medical research organizations) will likely 
find it harder to use these incentives. 
Robert Cooter has offered another approach for minimizing free-riding 
that is targeted at increasing overall levels of giving (instead of giving to a 
specific organization) and relies less on a given organization’s ability to it-
self harness social pressure. Cooter argues that when it comes to the social 
norms governing charitable giving, “[W]e don’t know exactly how much 
we ought to give . . . . Consequently, we don’t give very much to charity.”254 
To remedy the lack of information that makes complying with the social 
norm difficult, he proposes that charities create a donation registry. He envi-
sions that charities could pressure public figures (including politicians, ath-
letes, and entertainment stars) to disclose the portion of their adjusted gross 
income donated to charity.255 Cooter further suggests that the IRS should 
ask regular taxpayers to allow it to transmit to the donation registry the tax-
payer’s name and the percentage of adjusted gross income contributed.256 
He argues that armed with this information, we could use social pressure to 
increase giving. 
Would these types of social pressure constitute coercion? Not of the 
kind feared by libertarians and classical liberals, for it is not accompanied 
by the use of force. Consider a private school parent who does not contrib-
ute to the annual fund, or a neighborhood resident whom the donation regis-
try shows contributes either nothing to charity or far less than his neighbors. 
The worst that can happen is that other parents or neighbors may shun these 
individuals who contribute nothing. Although some may find that repercus-
sion distasteful, the other parents do not have the power to imprison or 
physically harm the non-donating parents.257  
                                                                                                                           
 254 Robert D. Cooter, The Donation Registry, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1981, 1981 (2004). 
 255 Id. at 1984–85. 
 256 Id. at 1985. 
 257 Some also may wonder whether using social pressure and other mechanisms dilutes the 
purity of altruistic voluntary giving. As one reader at a colloquium presentation of this Article 
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ii. Using contractual mechanisms to overcome market failure 
A variety of contractual or economic mechanisms can also be used to 
overcome an initial market failure.258 For example, the use of “tie-ins” can 
sometimes overcome free-rider problems.259 When providers use tie-ins, 
they charge not for the public good itself, but for another private good that 
is closely associated with the public good and that establishes exclusivity.260 
Take the quintessential example of a public good, the lighthouse.261 
Lighthouses are often thought to be subject to market failure because once 
the lighthouse is operating, nearby ships cannot be excluded from enjoying 
its light whether or not they have contributed to its existence. Therefore, the 
story goes, ship captains will not be willing to pay for its light, justifying 
the tax-funded governmental provision of lighthouses. Private actors, how-
ever, actually operated lighthouses in England up until the mid-1800s.262 
Operators avoided the free-rider problem by charging ships docking at 
nearby ports. The only way for a ship to avoid paying the fee was to avoid 
                                                                                                                           
asked, “[D]o we really want a society that gives . . . only out of some sense of competition instead 
of a desire to serve and give to others freely?” These mechanisms, however, fare no worse on that 
point than the financial incentives provided by the charitable deduction. Others may wonder 
whether reliance on these incentives (instead of tax subsidies) will cause charities to increase ex-
penditures on fundraising at a cost to their charitable activities. Two points deserve mention. First, 
empirical evidence is mixed as to how changes in tax subsidies affect the fundraising expenditures 
of non-profits. Some studies show that increases in the tax subsidies cause firms to decrease their 
expenditures, whereas other studies suggest that increases in the subsidies cause firms (counter-
intuitively) to increase such expenditures. See Brian Galle, How Do Nonprofit Firms Respond to 
Tax Policy? (Bos. Coll. Law Sch. Legal Studies Res. Paper No. 320), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2443621 [http://perma.cc/2Q37-3BAM]. Second, the fact that subsi-
dies may increase or decrease the amount firms spend on a given program is not dispositive for a 
libertarian or classical liberal. The activity itself must still be the type of activity for which a justi-
fication for the spending of state resources can be found. Once such a justification can be found, 
however, the subsidies’ impact may affect whether direct state provision or the subsidization of 
private providers is preferable. 
 258 See, e.g., Klein, supra note 211, at 471. 
 259 Demsetz, supra note 200, at 306 (suggesting that tie-ins make the private provision of 
some, but not all, collective goods possible); Klein, supra note 211, at 471. 
 260 Tie-ins only work, however, when there is a private good closely associated with the col-
lective good. When there is no such good (as with national defense, for example), using tie-ins is 
likely not very effective. Compare Klein, supra note 211, at 472–73 (exploring the ways in which 
national defense could be tied to various goods and services), with David Friedman, Problems in 
the Provision of Public Goods, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 505, 509–10 (1987) [hereinafter 
Friedman, Public Goods] (critiquing Klein’s arguments on this point). 
 261 See Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357, 357–58 (1974) 
(discussing the writings of John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick, Arthur Pigou, and Paul Samuelson, 
and their use of a lighthouse as an example of a public good). 
 262 Id. at 362–67. Another quintessential example of market failure—apple orchard owners 
and beekeepers—has also been similarly debunked. See Steven N. S. Cheung, The Fable of the 
Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16 J.L. & ECON. 11, 12–13 (1973). 
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the port, which often meant docking at a more treacherous shore or spend-
ing “an unduly long period at sea.”263 
Other examples include tying the payment for neighborhood security 
patrols (the joint good) to the purchase of a home in the covered neighbor-
hood (the private good),264 or tying the enjoyment of watching a sports 
game (the joint good) to the purchase of a seat (the private good).265 One 
can imagine a variety of tie-ins that could be used in the non-profit sector. 
Pew rents, for example, are a form of tie-in. So are preferred seats for 
shows and concerts. Although not exactly a tie-in in the strict sense, offer-
ing donors extra benefits, such as the ability to mingle with performers after 
shows and concerts, can serve the same role. This is not meant to be an ex-
clusive list, but rather to illustrate that a variety of mechanisms other than 
government intervention can be used to provide public goods. In the private 
arena, two examples of tie-ins are Starbucks’s bundling of aid to farmers in 
developing countries with the private good of coffee, and Toyota’s bundling 
of environmental protection with the private good of a Prius.266 
Free-riding, however, is not the only problem that can plague public 
goods. The assurance problem occurs when a given level of funding is 
needed to produce the good in question.267 A donor may be worried that if 
that level of funding is not reached, his or her contribution will effectively 
be wasted. The donor may wonder, “Why should I contribute money for 
vaccine research if that money will not do any good unless enough other 
people contribute?” As a result, he or she may decide not to contribute.268 
One scholar argues that the assurance problem can be overcome via condi-
tional binding assurance contracts (“CBACs”). In such contracts, a donor 
would pledge to support a given project, but that pledge would become en-
forceable only when total pledges reached the level necessary to fund the 
project.269 Although this issue has received less attention in the non-profit 
law area than the free-rider problem, one can imagine that at least some po-
tential donors are affected by it. In fact, two examples of affected areas—
                                                                                                                           
 263 Klein, supra note 211, at 454 (quoting Coase, supra note 261, at 375). 
 264 Id. at 452. The developer can require each home purchaser to pay a yearly fee for the pa-
trol service. 
 265 Id. at 455. 
 266 Henderson & Malani, supra note 30, at 594. 
 267 See generally Schmidtz, supra note 200 (describing contract solutions to the assurance 
problem). But for a critique of Schmidtz’s argument, see Friedman, Public Goods, supra note 260, 
at 512–20. 
 268 Schmidtz, supra note 200, at 476. 
 269 Id. Alternatively, a donor could be guaranteed a refund of her donation if enough others 
did not contribute to the project in question. See also Brubaker, supra note 244, at 151–53 (dis-
cussing a range of outcomes an individual donor may encounter). 
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vaccine research and public television funding—constitute activities found 
in the non-profit sector. 
c. Even if Market Failure, Then What? 
Despite the foregoing observations, it is likely that there are some ac-
tivities where free-riding continues to be an attractive option for many. This, 
however, does not necessarily answer the normative question of whether the 
government should provide a given good.270 One scholar notes that much 
economic analysis of public goods assumes very high transaction costs 
when private parties overcome market failures and very little inefficiencies 
or other costs when the government overcomes market failures.271 In his 
view, however, it might well be the case that once more realistic assump-
tions about the costs to each of the private sector and the government are 
used, government intervention might not be the best method of overcoming 
free-riding after all.272 
Assume, however, that government intervention is the best method of 
overcoming free-riding for these goods. Two further points arise. First, how 
would we know which public or quasi-public goods are actually subject to 
market failure such that subsidies for them can be justified? Would we only 
fund goods that are non-excludable, and stop funding excludable activities 
like museums and schools? How do we know which excludable goods gen-
erate positive externalities that are non-excludable? How would we know 
which types of providers can minimize free-riding by using tie-ins or other 
contractual arrangements? Likewise, how would we identify the types of 
providers that can use social pressure and the like to minimize free-riding? 
It would be hard to identify precisely which types of activities should merit 
subsidies if we more stringently enforced a prerequisite of free-riding. 
These difficulties do not undermine the larger point, however, which is that 
strict classical libertarian principles would justify a much smaller set of 
subsidies than under current law. 
Second, when the government does provide a public good, how do we 
determine the appropriate level of that public good? Some scholars have 
suggested that the governmental provision of public goods results in over-
production.273 When the government provides a public good, the cost is 
                                                                                                                           
 270 As Daniel Klein notes, “[C]ollective goods analysis is, like all analysis, policy-neutral . . . . 
‘The merits or demerits of subscription TV cannot be settled by an appeal to abstract reasoning or 
principles.’” Klein, supra note 211, at 471 (quoting Paul A. Samuelson, Public Goods and Sub-
scription TV: Correction of the Record, 7 J.L. & ECON. 81, 83 (1964)). 
 271 Cheung, supra note 262, at 32–33. 
 272 Id. 
 273 See, e.g., Edi Karni, On the Private Production of Public Goods, 34 REV. SOC. ECON. 41, 
49 (1976). 
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necessarily spread out, such that individuals might pay less than a market-
clearing price (assuming a market could be constructed for the good). Ra-
tional individuals may well demand more than otherwise, given this artifi-
cially low price, leading to oversupply.274 
Along those same lines, the charitable tax subsidies represent an odd 
version of government production: a private actor (the charity) is, in fact, 
producing a public good, but with a government subsidy. Assuming that the 
activities being subsidized suffer from market failure, classical liberal tenets 
suggest that subsidization is justified only if subsidizing the sector actually 
causes an increase in the output of the non-profit sector. 
Whether the charitable tax subsidies increase the non-profit sector’s 
output is an empirical question. Some have argued that the charitable tax 
subsidies do little to increase charitable giving. In their view, the fact that 
charity giving has remained a fairly constant percentage of the United 
States’ gross domestic product (“GDP”) despite fluctuations in the charita-
ble deduction suggests that the economy is the main factor driving levels of 
giving.275 But looking solely at the level of overall charitable giving likely 
obscures the way tax incentives impact the giving patterns of subsectors of 
society, such as the very wealthy.276 Given that most economists believe that 
the charitable tax subsidies increase charitable giving, and that classical lib-
erals tend to believe that rational individuals react to price changes, it is 
plausible for classical liberals to believe that the subsidies do increase chari-
table donations and therefore the production of public goods over an unsub-
sidized world. 
The bigger problem is determining what is the “right” amount of a 
given public good. The assumption under current law seems to be that more 
is better, but how do we know when we have enough of a given public 
good? Even if the tax subsidies increase giving over an unsubsidized world, 
                                                                                                                           
 274 See, e.g., SIMMONS, supra note 216, at 124–25; Karni, supra note 273, at 49. 
 275 See, e.g., Daniel J. Mitchell, Should We End the Tax Deduction for Charitable Donations? 
Yes: It Doesn’t Increase Giving, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 16, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424127887324469304578143351470610998 [http://perma.cc/6DXX-7GUG]. 
 276 Jon Bakija explains why the ratio of charitable donations to the GDP in the recent past has 
remained steady as follows. E-mail from Jon Bakija, Professor of Econ., Williams Coll., to author 
(Aug. 2, 2015, 09:31 EST) (on file with author). First, evidence suggests that giving as a share of 
one’s disposable income rises with income. Holding all else steady, then, the large increases in 
income to the wealthy in the recent past should have triggered more donations from that group. 
However, evidence also exists that tax incentives affect the donation patterns of the wealthy. As 
tax rates rise (decreasing the after-tax cost of giving), donations rise. Conversely, as tax rates drop 
(increasing the after-tax cost of giving), donations drop. In the recent past, the rise in income for 
the wealthy (which normally increases incentives to give) coincided with lower tax rates (which 
normally decrease incentives to give). Because these two incentives offset each other, overall 
giving levels remained steady. 
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how do we know that not subsidizing non-profits to produce public goods 
would actually lead to under-production? 
The absence of a market, of course, makes it hard to know. On one 
hand, a number of non-profits exist and contribute to society without bene-
fiting from the charitable tax subsidies. Charities that rely heavily on dona-
tions from non-itemizers, for example, are effectively operating without the 
subsidy of the charitable deduction. Likewise, charities that do not have 
accumulated earnings are operating without the subsidy of tax-exemption. 
Further, a number of the great philanthropic projects that shaped society in 
the last century were funded before the income tax, meaning that the fami-
lies establishing many civic institutions, such as libraries and museums, 
received no tax subsidies from their expenditures. 
On the other hand, even if free-riding may not be as prevalent as some 
believe, there is little reason to believe that it is nonexistent and that every-
one who desires a given public good is already contributing to it, rational or 
not. Thus, it seems plausible that due to some rational free-riders, voluntary 
unsubsidized donations may result in an under-supply. 
Assuming under-production, however, it is quite likely that the level of 
public goods produced by subsidizing them through the charitable deduc-
tion and tax exemption is closer to the right answer than either having the 
government provide the goods directly or determine the correct level of 
funding for each non-profit via direct grants. Because the charitable deduc-
tion provides a subsidy only when a taxpayer makes a contribution to an 
organization, the subsidy flows from individual choices instead of govern-
mental decisions. Because non-profits have to compete for donations, a 
market for donations essentially results. What is different, however, is that 
the government helps each buyer in this market (the donor) pay for the pur-
chase (the donation). But each donor is still the decisionmaker as to which 
non-profit gets the donated funds, and at what level. These donations may 
be the best signal that a good is under-supplied by the market and govern-
ment.277 
2. A More Expansive Classical Liberalism with a More Lenient Definition 
of Public Goods 
Not surprisingly, within classical liberalism, some theorists are com-
fortable with more government activity than others, and the above discus-
sions have assumed a fairly limited tolerance for government activity. To 
that end, the foregoing analyses of both minimal state libertarianism and 
classical liberalism have assumed that there must be a justification for the 
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state to exercise its coercive taxing power to fund a given type of activity 
(such as rectification or providing a safety net) in order for the charitable 
tax subsidies to fund the private provision of that activity. Justifying the 
state funding of the activity comes first, and the question of whether using 
the charitable tax subsidies to fund that activity is appropriate comes sec-
ond. As just shown, these interpretations of minimal state libertarianism and 
classical liberalism do not support the breadth of our current structure. 
But some classical liberals allow for more government activity while 
still believing that a great deal of what the modern regulatory state does is 
unjustified. There is thus a more permissive reading of classical liberalism 
that does support the current structure’s breadth. Under this view, the chari-
table sector itself is an activity worthy of funding for several reasons.278 
a. Better Information 
The first reason has to do with the dispersal of information. Take the 
above discussion of public goods. How would one know which activities 
are actually subject to market failure? Operationalizing a rule in which only 
such activities are eligible for the subsidies would require the lawmaker to 
identify whether the market is underfunding a given activity, such as art 
performances, poor relief, or environmental research. This, of course, re-
quires a great deal of information. For example, how can one body know 
what the proper amount of opera performances should be? That same body 
could never know the proper amount of wheat production. Instead, the mar-
ket finds the proper amount through the separate decisions of individuals 
who each have access to their own discrete information points. 
Using that reasoning, one might argue that by organizing as a non-
profit, founders of a given organization signal that they possess information 
that the activity might suffer from market failure.279 And by donating to that 
organization, donors are signaling that they have been convinced that the 
market is not providing enough of that activity and that the activity is wor-
thy of extra support. Together, these could be viewed as signals that the 
good or service is the type of activity with enough of the characteristics of a 
                                                                                                                           
 278 See E-mail from Richard A. Epstein, supra note 75 (arguing that the charitable deduction, 
which acts like a matching grant on the part of the government, is a superior method of funding 
public and quasi-public goods than direct government aid because of its decentralized nature); E-
mail from Maimon Schwarzschild, Professor of Law, Univ. of San Diego, to author (Apr. 6, 2015 
01:52 PST) (on file with author) (arguing that the deduction encourages an ethos of volunteerism 
and private giving, which is pluralism-enhancing and less sensitive to the public choice and cor-
ruption problems that can pervade direct governmental provision of public goods). 
 279 See Hansmann, supra note 224, at 69–70. 
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public good that a classical liberal would feel comfortable funding it, even 
if it is not a true public good.280 
Moreover, this mechanism is less likely to be subject to public choice 
concerns such as capture. Even if the list of eligible activities is broadly 
worded (“poor relief” instead of “soup kitchens”), one can imagine various 
types of non-profit organizations lobbying to be included on the list of eli-
gible activities while encouraging other types of activities to be left off of 
the list. The current mechanism has costs, such as funding seemingly silly 
activities like the ketchup museum.281 But having the government identify 
which projects merit subsidies also has costs, given that the government 
does not have perfect information either. Both mechanisms would likely 
result in the funding of some organizations that are not really public or even 
quasi-public goods. With respect to the subsidy that accompanies the chari-
table deduction, however, the size of the support is somewhat tied to the 
public’s enthusiasm for the project.282 The signaling mechanism of dona-
tions may thus be another reason to support the proposal that exemption be 
tied to a threshold level of donations.283 
b. Providing an Alternative to Government 
A second reason classical liberals might support a broad structure is to 
conceptualize the charitable sector as a public good in and of itself. Under 
this view, a healthy sector acts as a counterweight to governmental power 
and helps ensure that some activities remain in private control (even if sub-
sidized) rather than being directly undertaken by the government itself. And 
just as strong markets help ensure that government does not grow too large, 
a strong non-profit sector can act as a similar buffer. It also ensures that in 
areas where the government also operates, voices other than the govern-
ment’s weigh in on important policy issues. By subsidizing giving, the de-
duction encourages a voluntary ethos of giving that helps keep a need for 
coercive taxation at bay. In a variety of ways, therefore, a strong non-profit 
sector reduces dependence on government. Under this view, there is no need 
to justify funding a given activity within the sector because funding the sec-
tor itself is the good-producing act. 
                                                                                                                           
 280 This argument in many respects mirrors the donative theory developed by Colombo and 
Hall. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 32. 
 281 See Schizer, supra note 38, at 230 (raising the specter of an eccentric donor insistent on 
building a ketchup museum). 
 282 If anything, the subsidy may underrepresent the public enthusiasm for a project, because it 
does not account for non-itemizers and because it matches the enthusiasm of lower-income tax-
payers less heavily than upper-income taxpayers. 
 283 See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 32. 
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These arguments reflect many of the traditional justifications for sub-
sidizing the non-profit sector, and would not require subsidized groups to 
aid the poor. Under this view, redistribution of any type is not the goal of 
the sector, and the fact that many already-well-off individuals benefit from 
the subsidies exemplifies the fact that a variety of individuals benefit from 
any given governmental program. For example, better-off individuals bene-
fit more than others from a functioning market, but that does not mean there 
is anything per se wrong with the market. One might also argue that the 
availability of the charitable deduction distorts work incentives less than 
heavy taxation, and that a healthy economy that does not disincentivize the 
well-off ultimately aids the less wealthy. 
Although these arguments are compelling, the distributional conse-
quences of the charitable tax subsidies merit closer scrutiny nonetheless. It 
is true that redistribution is not the goal of many governmental activities, 
but the charitable tax subsidies are not the same as, say, the defense system. 
Namely, the charitable tax subsidies are often touted as a superior method of 
providing redistribution, and some argue direct governmental assistance to 
the poor should be replaced by increased charitable giving.284 Likewise, 
whenever changes to the sector are proposed, opponents of those changes 
insist that such changes should not be made because they would harm the 
poor.285 In reality, however, very little giving aids the poor. This is not to 
say that redistribution should be the only goal of the sector, only that aid to 
the poor is often publicly touted as a goal of the sector, and as such, that 
goal should be acknowledged and given more weight than under current 
law.286  
                                                                                                                           
 284 See, e.g., Mike Konczal, The Conservative Myth of a Social Safety Net Built on Charity, 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/03/the-conservative-
myth-of-a-social-safety-net-built-on-charity/284552 [http://perma.cc/4MWM-7FSP]. 
 285 See, e.g., Fred Stokeld, Budget Addresses Tax Treatment of Sports Events, Facilities, 146 
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Group of Senators Calling for Maintaining the Charitable Tax Deduction, U.S. SENATOR JOHN 
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 286 The next article in this series proposes changes to the structure to better balance distribu-
tive goals alongside pluralism and efficiency. 
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V. LEFT-LIBERTARIANISM 
The strands of libertarianism previously discussed reason that private 
ownership of previously un-owned natural resources necessarily follows 
from the concept self-ownership. In contrast, a set of “left-libertarian” theo-
rists challenge that reasoning, arguing that self-ownership does not neces-
sarily translate into unconstrained private ownership of resources. These 
theorists concur in the notion of self-ownership287 but believe that prior to 
appropriation, natural resources should be considered commonly owned (in-
stead of un-owned). Due to this common ownership, left-libertarians inter-
pret the Lockean proviso more stringently than right-libertarians. Nozick, 
for example, interprets the proviso to mean that appropriators cannot make 
others worse off than they were before appropriation (recall Alice and Ben 
from Part III, section A288). But according to left-libertarians, this sets the 
compensation too low, for it ignores the value those resources bring after 
appropriation.289 Left-libertarians also believe that revising the proviso to 
require that others be left some minimal or subsistence amount is too leni-
ent: 
Suppose that there are enough natural resources to give everyone 
fabulous life prospects, and someone appropriates (or uses) natu-
ral resources leaving others only minimally adequate life pro-
spects and generating ultra-fabulous life prospects for herself. It is 
implausible to hold that those who use or first claim a natural re-
source are entitled to reap all the benefits in excess of what is 
needed to leave others adequate life prospects. Natural resources 
were not created by any human agent and their value belongs to 
all of us in some egalitarian manner.290 
As a result, an individual who appropriates more than his or her fair 
share of natural resources must compensate others.291 Notably, left-
                                                                                                                           
 287 For left-libertarian discussions of self-ownership, see Peter Vallentyne, Left-
Libertarianism and Liberty, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 136, 138–
44 (Thomas Christiano & John Christman eds., 2009), and MICHAEL OTSUKA, LIBERTARIANISM 
WITH INEQUALITY 11–22 (2003). 
 288 See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text. 
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libertarians extend this fair share rule beyond initial acquisitions, arguing 
that it is an “ongoing requirement for continued ownership.”292 Imagine that 
Emma and Fred are the only two inhabitants on an island, and they initially 
divide the island’s resources fairly. If Georgia and Harry suddenly appear 
on the island, the existing allocation is not deemed fair simply because it 
was fair initially.293 Georgia and Harry merit a fair share of the island’s re-
sources, too. 
This of course, leads to the question of what is a “fair share” of natural 
resources. First, it should be thought of as a fair initial share. As with the 
liberal egalitarianism of Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and the luck egalitarians, 
left libertarians are unconcerned if holdings depart from a just initial distri-
bution because of voluntary choices.294 Assume that Emma’s and Fred’s 
initial holdings are fair. If Emma sunbathes on the beach each day while 
Fred works hard to improve his holdings, leading to later differences in 
welfare, so be it. In the real world, of course, there is no one point of time 
that we can look at to determine whether or not fair initial shares exist. The 
real world consists of people of all ages, some of whom are just starting out, 
and some of whom are further along in their lives and careers. For the latter, 
their holdings are likely a mix of luck and their own choices. What one can 
do, however, is apply this concept at the individual level and try to ensure 
that each person has a fair share at the start of his or her life.295 
Second, as in the liberal egalitarian literature, debate exists as to what 
counts as a natural resource296 and what constitutes a “fair share” of those 
resources. One interpretation (“equal share left-libertarianism”) is that ap-
propriators must leave “an equally valuable per capita share of the value of 
natural resources for others.”297 This distribution would be roughly equiva-
lent to that of the more basic resource egalitarianism, one that does not take 
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held in common. Larry Alexander, The Jurisdiction of Justice: Two Conceptions of Political Mo-
rality, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 949, 959–60 (2004). Imagine two individuals who wish to pick 
apples from a tree. One is short and can only reach the bottom apples. The other is tall but has 
trouble leaning down and can only reach the top apples. Alexander argues that only the apples in 
the middle, which both could reach, should be considered held in common. 
 297 Vallentyne, supra note 287, at 148. Henry George and Hillel Steiner are advocates of this 
interpretation. See, e.g., Hillel Steiner, The Natural Right to the Means of Production, 27 PHIL. Q. 
41, 49 (1977) (stating that “[e]ach individual has a right to an equal share of the basic non-human 
means of production” (emphasis omitted)). 
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into account disabilities or other personal characteristics that influence 
one’s ability to convert resources into welfare. The more common (and 
somewhat more expansive) left-libertarian interpretation, however, is that 
initial shares should give each individual an equal opportunity for wel-
fare.298 This conceptualization recognizes that innate differences in individ-
uals affect their ability to generate welfare. The most obvious example is 
that of a person who cannot walk; because that person needs funds to pur-
chase crutches or a wheelchair, he or she needs more resources than an able-
bodied person to achieve the same level of welfare.299 As discussed below, 
however, some theorists also argue that individuals with expensive tastes 
(champagne) or below-average talents (a bad singing voice) also merit extra 
resources so that they have the same shot at welfare as those with inexpen-
sive tastes (beer).300 
This leads to a final question. Ideally, society could identify individu-
als who have appropriated more than their share (or who currently have 
more than their fair share) and force only those people to compensate others 
who do not have a fair share. To some left-libertarians, this means that 
compensation would not be financed by universal taxation.301 In contrast, 
others essentially argue that universal taxation is justified on the grounds 
that one’s income represents one’s ability to convert resources into wel-
fare.302 Recall that the charitable tax subsidies invoke universal taxation, 
because Diane’s voluntary contribution elicits a match from the government 
(discussed in Part III, section B). Although it seems likely that those who 
support limited taxation for the purposes of ensuring a fair share would also 
support charitable tax subsidies for that purpose, what about stricter left-
libertarians? Perhaps they would, too. One member of the latter group has 
argued for a scheme whereby the “unjust” (prisoners) are taxed to pay com-
pensation to the less-advantaged when voluntary contributions to the less-
advantaged are insufficient to provide them with equal opportunity for wel-
fare.303 Under this view, the ideal of voluntary contributions can be supple-
mented with limited state measures.304 Given that this is exactly what the 
                                                                                                                           
 298 This is the interpretation favored by Vallentyne. See Vallentyne, supra note 287, at 149; 
see also OTSUKA, supra note 287, at 25. 
 299 See OTSUKA, supra note 287, at 27, 29. Notably, Michael Otsuka concedes that a disabled 
person such as Tiny Tim merits a greater share to compensate him for his disability, even if with-
out compensation his opportunity for welfare would be as great as the fully-abled (due to his sun-
ny disposition). Id. at 27. 
 300 See infra notes 318–320 and accompanying text (discussing fair shares). 
 301 OTSUKA, supra note 287, at 41–53. 
 302 PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS, REAL FREEDOM FOR ALL: WHAT (IF ANYTHING) CAN JUSTIFY 
CAPITALISM? §§ 113–19 (1995). 
 303 OTSUKA, supra note 287, at 41–53. 
 304 Id. 
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charitable tax subsidies do, perhaps adherents of this view would allow 
them on the grounds they supplement (and perhaps incentivize) voluntary 
contributions. 
This Article thus assumes that left-libertarianism countenances some 
state-financed redistribution to try to reach fair initial shares. Given that 
baseline, and the other benefits from having charities provide public goods 
in addition to the state,305 this Article also assumes for purposes of this sec-
tion that the charitable tax subsidies would be part of such a scheme. Even 
if, for example, a society decided to provide money directly to those with-
out a fair share, it is likely that such society would also want charitable ac-
tivity directed to the same goal. What left-libertarianism therefore means 
for the charitable tax subsidies overlaps in many respects with what the re-
source egalitarianism of Rawls, Dworkin, and others suggests,306 a question 
addressed extensively elsewhere.307 This Part shall briefly highlight a few 
points here.308 
Section A of this Part explores what implications the left-libertarian 
goal of equalizing fair shares of initial material resources has for the chari-
table tax subsidies.309 Section B expands the analysis by considering physi-
cal and mental endowments;310 section C addresses expensive tastes.311 Sec-
tion D briefly highlights a few implementation difficulties in structuring the 
charitable tax subsidies to reflect left-libertarian ideals.312 
A. Fair Shares of Material Resources 
As a starting point, both the “equal shares” and “equal opportunity for 
welfare” versions of left-libertarianism would support providing financial 
resources and their equivalent to children born into families with few finan-
cial resources so that such children have life prospects similar to children 
                                                                                                                           
 305 See supra notes 33–43 and accompanying text (Part I, section C); infra notes 322–324 and 
accompanying text (Part VI). 
 306 Scholars with similar views include Anne Alstott, Bruce Ackerman, Eric Rakowski, Rich-
ard Arneson, and G. A. Cohen. 
 307 See Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity, supra note 6. 
 308 Two related points not addressed here are whether left-libertarianism countenances assis-
tance only to the poor, or also to the middle-class, and whether it would require leveling down in 
addition to leveling up. Given the large overlap between left-libertarianism and resource egalitari-
anism, it seems plausible that some but not all interpretations of left-libertarianism would approve 
of assistance to the middle-class, and that most interpretations would require some leveling down. 
For a fuller exploration of these questions, see Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity, supra note 6, at 
652–60. For a discussion of the measurement and implementation issues implicated by this analy-
sis, see id. at 643–45, 660–62. 
 309 See infra notes 313–314 and accompanying text (section A). 
 310 See infra notes 315–317 and accompanying text (section B). 
 311 See infra notes 318–320 and accompanying text (section C). 
 312 See infra note 321 and accompanying text (section D). 
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from affluent families.313 Obvious examples include the direct provision of 
resources in the form of programs such as pre- and post-natal care for poor 
mothers, health care for poor children, orphanages, adoption groups, tutor-
ing programs, libraries, scholarship programs, private schools in poor areas, 
projects like the Harlem Children’s Enterprise Zone, and the like.314 With 
respect to training programs, it seems logical that skills that are obviously 
practical and relevant to entering the workplace should also be provided. 
This is so because poor children who do not have a chance to develop mar-
ketable skills due to unequal resources are at a disadvantage both in terms 
of resources and in terms of the opportunity to convert their personal en-
dowments into welfare. Such training programs would include, for example, 
reading skills programs, as well as groups that help children develop mar-
ketable practical skills (such as preparing inner-city children for careers as 
auto mechanics). 
A harder case involves programs such as chess teams, golf classes or 
music camps for non-wealthy children. These appear frivolous at first, as 
the skills that they enable children to develop seem less marketable than 
learning how to fix cars. For example, helping a poor but talented cellist to 
attend music camp may have no impact on his or her financial resources 
later. So would a left-libertarian scheme of charitable subsidies treat the 
development (in children) of all skills and talents equally? 
The answer is likely yes. If the goal is to give disadvantaged children 
the same life prospects as others, society should not differentiate among 
various skills and talents for several reasons. First, although most young 
cellists do not become professional musicians, the child given a scholarship 
to music camp might be the next Yo-Yo Ma. Second, these activities are 
valuable even if they remain hobbies. Helping an individual develop a non-
marketable talent (in addition to simply providing the individual with mate-
rial resources) is integral to ensuring he or she has similar life prospects, 
especially if his or her conception of a good life includes the activity in 
question. And finally, engaging in these activities develops skills, such as 
patience and discipline, which do have practical financial rewards. 
1. Cultural Appreciation 
Now consider organizations like museums and theaters that allow the 
poor and middle-class to enjoy cultural benefits. Is access to such goods 
                                                                                                                           
 313 Recall the discussion conceptualizing fair initial shares on an individual basis by focusing 
on what resources and assets one has at birth. See supra note 294–295 and accompanying text. 
 314 Although this project is academic in nature (instead of prescriptive), a great deal of re-
search exists analyzing the effectiveness of various programs in assisting those with fewer finan-
cial advantages. To that end, delineating a list of programs that level up in this manner should not 
present policymakers who choose to follow this path with an insurmountable hurdle. 
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part of ensuring similar life prospects for all, or simply catering to expen-
sive tastes? 
It is most likely the former. Opportunities for cultural appreciation 
might introduce poor children to talents and interests of which they were 
previously unaware, thereby broadening their life prospects. Wealthy chil-
dren with access to these cultural resources likely have broad conceptions 
of “the good life.” In contrast, poor children who do not have such access 
may well envision narrower life prospects for themselves. This distinction 
seems to violate the left-libertarian goal of ensuring equal life prospects. 
This analysis answers one recurring question: a set of charitable tax 
subsidies inspired by this interpretation of left-libertarianism would subsi-
dize cultural groups, such as museums and the opera, only if they offered 
free or discounted admission to the poor or otherwise helped the financially 
disadvantaged develop their abilities. 
2. Assistance to Adults 
The foregoing has focused on assistance to children, because it is easy 
to hold children unaccountable (in the choice or chance distinction) for their 
financial circumstances. But children do not exist in a vacuum; they live 
with adults. And although the adults’ situations reflect a mix of choice and 
chance, from the children’s perspectives, their families’ circumstances are 
pure chance. Does helping the adults comport with left-libertarianism by 
increasing the children’s life prospects, or does it undermine left-
libertarianism by rewarding the adults’ poor choices? Imagine a family that 
lacks health insurance in which the mother is ill because she smoked her 
entire life. Refusing to aid the mother harms her child’s life prospects; yet 
helping her compensates her for her voluntary prior choices. Here, keeping 
the parent healthy likely brings such great benefits to the child that they 
outweigh any negative incentive effects from aiding the mother despite her 
poor past choices. To that end, the charitable tax subsidies would subsidize 
groups that provide basic necessities (food, clothing, shelter, health care) for 
poor adults caring for young children. 
A harder question involves groups that provide basic services to disad-
vantaged childless adults. What about assisting groups that provide similar 
services to needy adults who are not parents? One might counsel against 
assisting such adults on the grounds that their past choices led them to their 
current straits. This response would hold disadvantaged adults responsible 
for past choices such as quitting school or pursuing minimum wage jobs. 
Aiding them would not create equal life prospects ex ante, but instead 
would effectuate ex post equalization that ignores the role of choice. 
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Ongoing inequality, however, makes it hard to know whether an adult 
individual’s dire circumstances are the result of choice or chance. Imagine 
Ivan, who grows up in a high crime area with terrible public schools, avoids 
college, and is recently laid off from a factory job. Is he a victim of chance, 
choice, or a combination? Answering this question likely turns on one’s 
opinion about the current state of society. If one believes that many public 
schools fail to provide an adequate education that allows children to devel-
op their talents, then Ivan may seem more a victim of chance. But if one 
thinks that any given public school can adequately prepare a hard worker 
for college, and that there are enough scholarships out there, then Ivan 
seems more culpable for his plight. 
B. Physical and Mental Endowments and Equal Opportunity for Welfare 
As mentioned previously, left-libertarians disagree as to whether one’s 
fair share of resources should be an “equal share” of initial resources or a 
share that provides one with equal opportunity for welfare. For those who 
think the former, the charitable tax subsidies would likely be limited, as dis-
cussed above, to programs that are rough equivalents to distributing finan-
cial resources to individuals who are poor through no fault of their own. 
Those who think the latter, however, would likely support a somewhat ex-
panded set of charitable tax subsidies. This section shall start by addressing 
disabilities.315 
If one interprets left-libertarianism in the latter manner, left-
libertarianism also countenances subsidizing health organizations and 
groups that assist the disabled even if they do not offer free or reduced-cost 
services to the poor. This is so because among individuals with equal 
amounts of material resources, a disabled individual is at a disadvantage in 
terms of accessing welfare due to lesser physical endowment. Providing 
medical care (even if the individual pays for it) is equivalent to transferring 
nonfinancial resources (better health, pain relief, or a leg that is no longer 
broken). Thus, simply providing health care should be viewed as a transfer 
of nonfinancial resources that are distinct from financial resources. 
Still assuming equal material resources, should providing medical care 
for a cost be considered “charitable” in the sense contemplated by the chari-
table tax subsidies? How is providing health care for a price any different 
than providing a consumer good, such as an iPad, for a price? The efficien-
                                                                                                                           
 315 Most left-libertarians draw a line between compensating for diminished physical and men-
tal endowments on one hand, and compensating for expensive tastes and talent-pooling on the 
other. See Barbara H. Fried, Left Libertarianism: A Review Essay, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 86 
(2004); Peter Vallentyne, Left-Libertarianism: A Primer, in LEFT LIBERTARIANISM AND ITS CRIT-
ICS: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 1, 19–20 n.20 (Peter Vallentyne & Hillel Steiner eds., 2000). 
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cy scholarship helps provide an answer. It posits that activities suffering 
from contract failure (such as medical care) form as non-profits to over-
come information asymmetries, but then face difficulties raising capital due 
to the non-distribution constraint.316 Without a subsidy, the medical care 
needed to remedy the individual’s disability may not be provided. Subsidiz-
ing health care therefore allows the disabled individual to remedy the phys-
ical disadvantage (for example, by fixing a broken leg). This reduces the 
inequality in physical endowments. 
 If the individual in question pays for the health service, however, now 
the individual’s material resources are diminished. The individual no longer 
has the same financial resources as his or her peers to pursue his or her life 
prospects (recall that this discussion is assuming equal initial financial re-
sources). Fully remedying the physical disadvantage would therefore re-
quire both fixing the physical disability and addressing the resulting dispari-
ty in financial resources.317 Does this mean we should require subsidized 
medical providers to offer free medical care in order to address both dispari-
ties simultaneously? Probably not, as such a requirement is likely not eco-
nomically feasible; even with a subsidy medical providers could not afford 
to provide all their services for free, and requiring them to do so would like-
ly cause an under-supply of providers. Remedying all of the inequalities 
resulting from physical disabilities thus seems impractical. But even if those 
inequalities cannot be fully mitigated via the charitable tax subsidies, it 
seems better to address at least some of the inequality by subsidizing health 
care organizations so that they can exist. 
Hospitals and health care organizations could therefore further equal-
ize life prospects as envisioned by left-libertarianism without providing 
charity care. However, any provider that does offer free or reduced-cost ser-
vices would be mitigating inequality in two ways, and therefore deserves an 
additional subsidy. 
C. Expensive Tastes 
Although most left-libertarians believe that one’s fair share should be 
adjusted to reflect internal differences in physical and mental endowments, 
what exactly this should encompass is contested. Several theorists believe, 
for example, that individuals with expensive tastes should be compen-
                                                                                                                           
 316 See Hansmann, supra note 224, at 69–75 (discussing the advantages that non-profits have 
in responding to contract failure and the disadvantages they face in raising capital). 
 317 To be sure, some physical impairments may never be fully remedied. Even with implants 
and hearing aids, for example, some deaf individuals may never hear as sharply as non-deaf indi-
viduals. As such, this discussion uses the words “remedy,” “fix,” and “address” in a general sense 
to mean “limit disadvantages as much as possible.” 
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sated.318 If a preference for expensive champagne is as arbitrary as a physi-
cal trait, such as hair, then that preference impacts one’s ability to convert 
resources into welfare; for example, a beer drinker can afford much more of 
his or her preferred beverage than a champagne drinker can with the same 
amount of resources.319  
Admitting the need to compensate for expensive tastes when seeking 
equality of opportunity for welfare would justify an even broader set of 
charitable tax subsidies. Consider, for example, the “high arts.” An individ-
ual who has a taste for the opera is worse off than one who has a taste for 
American Idol. This is so not only because the opera is costlier, but also 
because it suffers from market failure and therefore would not exist absent 
some state subsidization to overcome collective action problems. As inter-
preted in this manner, left-libertarianism would thus subsidize groups like 
Ivy League universities and the opera that provide expensive services for a 
fee, even if they did not provide assistance to the poor. If they did provide 
services to the poor, however, they would merit an extra set of subsidies.320 
D. Implementation Concerns 
As with the interpretations of libertarianism previously discussed, 
structuring a set of subsidies to reflect left-libertarian ideals presents some 
implementation questions: who counts as poor for purposes of equal share 
left-libertarianism? Should the middle-class also benefit from these poli-
cies? Should leveling down be required in addition to leveling up? What of 
the fact that the deduction only subsidizes the expensive tastes of taxpayers 
who itemize, and subsidizes the tastes of upper-income taxpayers more 
heavily than lower-income taxpayers? 
Unlike the challenges that accompany rectification, however, these 
concerns do not present insurmountable design challenges. They require 
judgment calls (e.g., who counts as poor?), but once decisions have been 
made, such individuals can be identified. Leveling down can be implement-
ed by not subsidizing donations to groups over which the donor or a family 
member has control or from which such individuals receive benefits. 
                                                                                                                           
 318 At least some left-libertarians would compensate for expensive tastes. They frequently cite 
to the works of luck egalitarians Arneson and Cohen, who support the notion of expensive tastes, 
when discussing what “equality of opportunity for welfare” means. 
 319 On the other hand, most left-libertarians reject the notion of talent-pooling. See, e.g., 
OTSUKA, supra note 287, at 27; VAN PARIJS, supra note 302. Briefly, talent-pooling is based on 
the idea that one’s skill set is a matter of luck. For example, the fact that Michelle Wie has much 
more natural talent for golf than this author is as arbitrary as one’s brown hair. Thus, if this author 
preferred to be a professional golfer rather than a tax professor, she would merit compensation for 
her arbitrary disadvantage. This is obviously quite controversial. See Fleischer, Equality of Oppor-
tunity, supra note 6, at 629–30, for a longer discussion. 
 320 This is similar to the health care example discussed in Part V, section B. 
2015] Libertarianism and the Charitable Tax Subsidies 1413 
Changing the deduction to a credit removes the problems identified earlier 
with respect to the differential subsidization of expensive tastes.321 
VI. IS OUTSOURCING THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS TO NON-PROFITS 
CONSISTENT WITH LIBERTARIANISM? 
The foregoing has shown that several strands of libertarianism support 
either limited government redistribution or the provision of public goods (or 
both), although the purposes and scope of permissible activities vary among 
libertarian theories. Lurking throughout this discussion has been the as-
sumption that if the government can legitimately provide a public good, it 
could also subsidize the provision of that public good by a third party. But 
is this necessarily true? After all, when the government does something, 
voters can act as a check on it. But if a third party is acting in its stead, who 
acts as a check?322 
For a number of reasons, libertarian and classical liberal ideals would 
likely countenance this outsourcing. As an initial matter, public goods might 
suffer not only from market failures, but also from government failures. The 
government generally provides goods at either the level demanded by the 
median voter or the level determined through log-rolling and other legisla-
tive processes. It is possible that this level is not the socially optimal level 
of provision, either. In fact, one standard economic justification for the 
charitable tax subsidies stems from this conception of government failure. It 
posits that voters who desire more of a given public good than the level de-
termined by the democratic process agree to provide partial funding for 
each others’ projects via the charitable tax subsidies. Opera lovers might not 
be willing to fund the full costs of protecting the ruffled grouse, and vice 
versa, but each might be willing to partly fund the costs of the others’ pro-
jects.323 If some strands of libertarianism would support the outright gov-
ernment provision of public goods in order to produce the optimal level of 
such goods when markets cannot determine that level, why would they not 
support the partial subsidization of such goods as well if that were a neces-
sary part of overcoming market failure for such goods? 
Further, classical liberal tenets suggest that the private provision of 
public goods would likely be preferable to the public provision of such 
goods. For one thing, a vibrant charitable sector acts as a counterweight to 
                                                                                                                           
 321 Much more can be said along these lines, of course, and many of these issues have been 
discussed elsewhere. See, e.g., Miranda Perry Fleischer, Charitable Contributions in an Ideal 
Estate Tax, 60 TAX L. REV. 263 (2007); Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity, supra note 6; Miranda 
Perry Fleischer, The Surprising Philosophical Roots of the Charitable Tax Subsidies, in THE 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TAX LAW (forthcoming 2016) (on file with author). 
 322 Thank you to Michael Doran for raising this point. 
 323 See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 32, at 107–08; Weisbrod, supra note 32, at 36. 
1414 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:1345 
governmental power. The more private groups can provide public goods 
(even if subsidized by the government), the less economic power the gov-
ernment has. Additionally, the market for charitable contributions mirrors 
the for-profit market in many respects. Charities must compete with each 
other in a market for donations; ineffective and unpopular charities receive 
fewer contributions than others, just as ineffective for-profit firms are not as 
successful. Given this competition, it is plausible that charities are more 
efficient than government in the sense of spending more of each dollar re-
ceived on goods and services. 
Lastly, as in the traditional market, the output of the charitable market 
represents the independent decisions of diffuse people. One reason classical 
liberals favor the market over government when it comes to directing eco-
nomic activity is that the former can harness the vast knowledge of dis-
persed individuals. In contrast, it is impossible for a centralized deci-
sionmaker to have enough knowledge to make efficient decisions about 
economic activity. Support for school vouchers exemplifies the classical 
liberal preference for individualized decision making over centralized deci-
sion making; one way to think about the charitable tax subsidies is that they 
are essentially vouchers for charitable goods and services.324 As a result, 
donors and non-profit founders, who likely have better information than the 
government about the need for a given public good-type activity, can decide 
which charitable goods and services to provide, and in what form and quan-
tity. Local individuals on the ground in a given area can better identify 
which types of programs, such as job training or after-school sports activi-
ties for troubled youth, will be most effective. 
On the other hand, libertarian principles are less supportive of out-
sourcing and privatization when those measures amount to giving a chosen 
provider a state-sponsored monopoly. This is often the case, for example, 
when governments turn over management or ownership of existing inter-
ests, such as toll roads or golf courses, to private companies. That concern, 
however, seems less applicable in this context. Here, the government is not 
choosing which soup kitchens or environmental research groups receive 
subsidies. Instead, individuals are making those choices. All the groups 
must do to receive subsidies is comply with a set of fairly lenient rules de-
signed to ensure that they are serving a public rather than a private interest. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has rigorously explored the philosophical literature on lib-
ertarianism for insights into some recurring questions concerning the chari-
                                                                                                                           
 324 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 158–71. 
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table tax subsidies: are they consistent with our notion of the role of gov-
ernment? Which organizations should be subsidized? Should they be re-
quired to help the poor? Not surprisingly, various conceptions of libertarian-
ism yield conflicting answers. 
 Some conceptions of libertarianism suggest that the charitable tax 
subsidies are illegitimate and should be abolished. These versions of liber-
tarianism give almost absolute priority to private property rights, and forbid 
all government activity but the most minimal provision of public goods 
necessary to protect life and property. Subsidizing the provision of addition-
al public goods or redistribution is therefore unwarranted. 
Several other strands of libertarianism, however, see a broader role for 
the state. Some libertarians and classical liberals believe that the state 
should provide a minimal safety net to the very poor, but no more. This 
suggests that charitable tax subsidies for organizations that assist the very 
poor are legitimate. Many classical liberals further believe that the state can 
subsidize the provision of additional public goods (such as schools and 
health care), provided that a market failure exists. That said, a strict inter-
pretation of classical liberalism shows that many goods subsidized under 
the current structure would not be subsidized using a more rigorous defini-
tion of market failure. On the other hand, a more lenient reading of classical 
liberalism that conceives of the non-profit sector as a public good in and of 
itself might justify something like our current structure, as does left-
libertarianism. 
As with other theories of distributive justice common to tax policy, a 
commonality emerges from these various interpretations. Almost all would 
subsidize aid to the very poorest members of society, but then each concep-
tion differs in what additional activities it would subsidize. This suggests 
that there is something special about aid to the poor. The final Article in this 
series shall examine this implication. 
 
   
 
